By the Editorial Board of the Financial Times
China called Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow this week “a journey of friendship”. Few people know what China’s leader said privately in two days of talks with his “dear friend” Vladimir Putin. There was little public sign, though, that he put any meaningful pressure on Russia’s president to end his war in Ukraine. Indeed, Beijing reinforced western impressions that it is firmly in Moscow’s camp.
A joint statement to which Xi put his name on Tuesday did not demand that Russia withdraw its troops from Ukraine, honour Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders or even repeat the call for a ceasefire that Beijing made in a “position paper” on the conflict last month. The statement said the “purposes and principles” of the UN charter must be observed — but failed to condemn Moscow’s glaring violation of the article stating that UN members should refrain from the “use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”.
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When Beijing unveiled its “peace plan” for Ukraine, at least some in the west were willing to give it the benefit of the doubt. Xi’s performance in Moscow has largely dashed any hope that China — after brokering a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran — could act as a credible peacemaker in Ukraine. By leaning towards Moscow, Beijing drives a further wedge between itself and trading partners in Europe and the US on whom it depends for economic growth. It is following a risky course.
Tactically, Putin has little chance of winning the war, especially given the increasing supply of weapons from Ukraine’s allies. This leaves Beijing with the prospect of either being on the side of the losing combatant or of forming common cause with Russia in a bitter but bogged-down conflict.
Diplomatically, China appears insincere. Its joint statement with Russia calls on all countries to carry forward the values of “peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy and freedom”. This type of exhortation not only sounds tone deaf, but undercuts any possibility that its paper on peace in Ukraine will be taken seriously outside countries that have already veered towards Moscow.
Economically, China and Russia are ever more intertwined, as Beijing becomes a vital buyer of oil and gas that Russia can no longer sell to western customers. The planned Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline would further cement ties. Moscow also imported $4.8bn in electrical machinery and parts from China last year as supplies from other countries plummeted, according to Bruegel, a Brussels-based think-tank.
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It remains uncertain whether China aims to deliver lethal aid to Russia, as US officials fear. Beijing surely understands that such a move would incur deep animosity in Nato, and risk bringing it into a proxy war with the US and its allies. Beijing has, however, been supplying dual-use goods such as semiconductors that Moscow desperately needs, diluting western sanctions.
The “no limits” partnership Xi and Putin declared last year, shortly before Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine, was always highly unequal. Moscow’s war has left it even more dependent on China. This gives Xi real leverage, should he choose to use it. It may not be in Beijing’s interest for Putin to suffer a humiliating defeat, putting his leadership at risk. But nor is it in its interest to be dragged deeper into a long and destabilising conflict.
A wiser course for Beijing would be to put more public daylight between itself and Moscow’s aggression, and privately to impress on Putin that he cannot win in Ukraine. Beijing’s current path only serves to fuel more tension with the west and accelerate the decoupling from its biggest trade partners.
