Scrap the Public Protector? A retired brigadier makes the case for a permanent Madlanga

The Madlanga Commission has now sat for more than 170 days, dragging South Africa's police, intelligence and prosecuting authorities through allegations of criminal infiltration at the highest levels. In this piece, retired brigadier Fanie Bouwer asks an uncomfortable question: what happens to all that investigative capability once the Commission's final report lands in November? Rather than mothballing it, he proposes folding it into a permanent Chapter 9 institution — a Constitutional Anti-Corruption Commission — built to do what the Public Protector's ombudsman model was never designed for. It would mean amending the Constitution. Bouwer thinks that's precisely the point..By Brig (Retd) Fanie Bouwer.Perhaps South Africa should stop creating temporary commissions to investigate permanent problems.This started as nothing more than a thought.I have since looked at what the Madlanga Commission has actually uncovered, what its terms of reference permit it to do, what the Public Protector's office costs the taxpayer and, importantly, where the functions of the two institutions overlap - and where they do not.The idea now seems worth putting into the public domain.It is this: Should South Africa consider amending the Constitution to replace the present Public Protector model with a permanent Chapter 9 institution based on the investigative capability demonstrated by the Madlanga Commission?I am not suggesting that the Public Protector's constitutional purpose is unnecessary. I am asking whether the institution created in 1996 is still the best institutional answer to the kind of corruption and criminal infiltration South Africa is confronting in 2026. There is a substantial difference.The Public Protector is essentially an ombudsman and maladministration watchdog. Section 182 of the Constitution empowers it to investigate improper conduct in state affairs or public administration, report on it and take appropriate remedial action. It must also be accessible to all persons and communities.That is an important function.But the crisis exposed by the Madlanga Commission is something more sinister and structurally different. It concerns allegations of criminal networks penetrating law-enforcement institutions, political interference, corruption, manipulation of investigations, relationships between officials and alleged criminal figures, and the possible failure of institutions themselves to investigate wrongdoing effectively.That requires an institution capable of following the whole chain. And that is precisely what makes Madlanga interesting.What Madlanga has actually demonstratedThe Commission was established following Lieutenant-General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi's allegations concerning criminality, political interference and corruption in the criminal justice system.It has now been sitting for an extraordinary period.When it resumed in September 2026, the Commission was on its 173rd day of hearings, and its work had expanded to alleged criminal infiltration and collusion involving the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department.That is no longer a narrow inquiry into one allegation.The evidence heard has ranged across SAPS, Crime Intelligence, IPID, metro policing, organised crime investigations and other parts of the criminal justice environment.The Commission's own published hearing record illustrates the breadth of the inquiry. Evidence has included allegations concerning SAPS task teams, IPID investigations, alleged payments connected to police killings, Crime Intelligence and alleged criminal networks.Importantly, allegations made before the Commission remain allegations unless and until established through proper processes.That distinction is crucial.But so is another fact: The Commission has not merely listened to allegations. It has been able to make referrals and recommendations while the inquiry is still under way.Its first interim report resulted in referrals involving SAPS officials and employees of the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, with allegations including corruption, fraud, murder, perjury and other unlawful conduct. The Presidency expressly noted that, apart from one individual, some of those implicated had not yet given their response and that the allegations therefore remained prima facie allegations rather than findings against them.Then came the second interim report.In August 2026 the Presidency announced that, on the basis of evidence heard during 2026, the Commission recommended disciplinary proceedings and immediate criminal investigations concerning Lieutenant-General Shadrack Sibiya, Witness G, Sergeant Fannie Nkosi and Brown Mogotsi. It also recommended an investigation into an alleged off-the-books Crime Intelligence operation. That is a significant difference from the traditional complaint-driven model.The Commission is able to identify a problem, hear evidence, test that evidence, identify prima facie concerns and then push the matter into another investigative or prosecutorial process without simply waiting for the entire inquiry to end.Its terms of reference expressly provide for this.Clause 10.4 gives the Commission the power to refer matters for immediate criminal investigation and urgent decisions on prosecution.Clause 12 provides for referrals for prosecution, further investigation or a separate inquiry to the appropriate law-enforcement agency, government department or regulator. That is potentially the model South Africa should examine.But what does the Public Protector do? Here lies the important qualification.The Public Protector is not simply another anti-corruption commission. Its constitutional mandate is considerably broader in one direction.Section 182 permits investigation of any conduct in state affairs or public administration that is alleged or suspected to be improper or prejudicial. It must be accessible to ordinary citizens and communities.That means a resident whose municipality fails to provide a service, whose government application disappears, who suffers maladministration or who encounters improper conduct by a public official can approach the Public Protector.That citizen-facing function cannot simply be discarded.But there is nevertheless substantial overlap.A corrupt municipal tender can involve maladministration, improper conduct and abuse of public resources - matters capable of falling within the Public Protector's jurisdiction. The same matter could also constitute serious corruption requiring criminal investigation.Likewise, improper conduct by a senior police official could potentially fall within the Public Protector's broad jurisdiction while simultaneously involving criminality, disciplinary misconduct and organised criminal infiltration - matters more closely resembling the Madlanga mandate.The difference is therefore not simply what they can investigate.It is what the investigation is designed to achieve.The Public Protector investigates, reports and takes appropriate remedial action.Madlanga was designed to expose a systemic problem, hear evidence publicly, identify prima facie wrongdoing and refer matters for criminal investigation, prosecution, disciplinary action or further inquiry.That is a very different weapon for a very different problem.And then there is the moneyThe financial argument is stronger than I initially realised.The National Treasury's 2026 Estimates of National Expenditure allocate R411.9 million to the Public Protector for 2026/27. Of that, R230.9 million is allocated to investigations, compared with R155.3 million for administration and R25.6 million for stakeholder management. The office has a funded establishment of 388 posts.The Treasury expects the Public Protector's total expenditure to rise to R429.6 million in 2027/28 and R441.8 million in 2028/29. This is not pocket money.But there is an important point here. I would not argue that the entire R411.9 million could simply be transferred to a new Madlanga institution.That would be misleading. Some of the Public Protector's existing functions would have to remain somewhere.The proper question is: Could Parliament obtain greater constitutional value by reorganising these functions and redirecting a substantial portion of the resources currently devoted to them into a permanent institution specifically designed to investigate systemic corruption and criminal infiltration of the state? That is a much harder question to dismiss.South Africa already has another lesson.There is also a danger of creating yet another institution when South Africa already has several bodies dealing with corruption.The Special Investigating Unit, for example, has a primary mandate to investigate serious malpractice, maladministration and corruption affecting state institutions. It can refer cases for prosecution, institute civil proceedings and assist with recovery of public funds. Its 2026/27 budget is about R1.446 billion.The National Prosecuting Authority's Investigating Directorate is also being strengthened. National Treasury says R1 billion is allocated over the medium term to the Investigating Directorate to support specialist prosecutors, criminal and financial investigators and forensic personnel dealing with high-profile and complex corruption matters.So the proposal should not be: "Let's create another anti-corruption body." South Africa already has enough bodies.The question is whether we can rationalise them.Perhaps the future institution should absorb or coordinate selected functions rather than simply becoming another layer of bureaucracy.What I would proposeImagine a new Chapter 9 institution. Call it, for argument's sake, the Constitutional Anti-Corruption Commission. Its mandate would be narrower than the Public Protector in one respect but far more powerful in another.Its primary responsibility would be: to investigate systemic corruption, organised criminal infiltration of state institutions, serious abuse of public power and interference with the criminal justice system.It would have:permanent investigative staff; forensic accountants; criminal and financial investigators; specialist prosecutors or direct prosecutorial referral mechanisms; legal counsel; intelligence and data-analysis capability; protected whistle-blower mechanisms; powers to subpoena documents and witnesses as provided by law; the ability to conduct confidential investigations; the ability to hold public hearings when appropriate; the power to refer matters immediately for criminal investigation or prosecution; and a constitutional obligation to report regularly to Parliament and the public.The commissioners themselves would not need to sit every day. They could sit when necessary.The permanent machinery would be the investigative organisation supporting them.That would solve one of the obvious problems with the present Madlanga model: it is simply impossible to expect commissioners to conduct hundreds of days of hearings indefinitely. Tthe institution could continue indefinitely.A commission does not have to be permanent merely because its investigative capability is permanent. And there is one enormous safeguard: The appointment process would have to be designed with exceptional care.If Parliament simply appoints another group of political favourites, the whole exercise would be pointless.The institution must be genuinely independent.Its commissioners should be appointed through a transparent, multiparty and publicly scrutinised process, with clearly defined qualifications and security of tenure.Its budget should be protected. Its investigations should not be subject to ministerial direction.Its reports should be public except where secrecy is demonstrably necessary to protect an investigation, a witness or national security.Otherwise South Africa would merely exchange one set of problems for another.The constitutional obstacle is also the pointThe Public Protector is not an ordinary government department that Parliament can simply close. It is entrenched in Chapter 9 of the Constitution.That means a serious reform would require a constitutional amendment. Perhaps that is exactly what should happen. Not because the Constitution has failed, but because the Constitution provides a mechanism for changing institutions when the country determines that change is necessary.The question South Africans should therefore debate is not: "Do we like or dislike the Public Protector?" It should be: "What constitutional accountability machinery do we need for the South Africa we actually have in 2026?"If the answer is that ordinary citizens still need an accessible ombudsman, preserve that function. If the answer is that South Africa desperately needs a permanent institution capable of investigating systemic corruption and criminal infiltration of the state, create it. And if both functions are important, then separate them.Perhaps this is the real lesson of Madlanga. The Madlanga Commission was created because something extraordinary had happened.But after more than 170 hearing days, it is becoming difficult to describe what it has exposed simply as an extraordinary event.The Commission's work has ranged across policing, intelligence, organised crime, political interference, municipal law enforcement and allegations of criminal networks operating within or around state institutions.Its second interim report has already resulted in recommendations for disciplinary action and immediate criminal investigations. Its final report is currently scheduled for November 2026.So perhaps the question we should be asking is not:"When will Madlanga finish?"Perhaps it is: "What happens to the capability Madlanga has created when it does?"Will South Africa simply disband the investigators, lawyers and evidence-gathering machinery and wait for the next crisis?.Read more:.Brig Fanie Bouwer: Madlanga Commission - Don't pull the plug.Will we then establish another temporary commission? And another one after that? Or will we finally recognise that corruption and criminal infiltration of the state are not temporary problems?Perhaps South Africa does not need another commission.Perhaps it needs to turn the Madlanga model into a permanent constitutional capability.That is an idea worth debating.Not because the Public Protector has no legitimate purpose, but because the protection of constitutional democracy may require us to build institutions capable of dealing with the threats that exist today; not merely those that existed when the Constitution was written thirty years ago..Sign up for your early morning brew of the BizNews Insider to keep you up to speed with the content that matters. The newsletter will land in your inbox every morning on weekdays. Register here.Support South Africa's bastion of independent journalism, offering balanced insights on investments, business, and the political economy, by joining BizNews Premium. 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Scrap the Public Protector? A retired brigadier makes the case for a permanent Madlanga

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