Key topics:DA’s role in GNU II mirrors NP struggles in GNU I with limited influence.ANC steers policies unilaterally, sidelining coalition partners.DA faces dilemma: stay in GNU or oppose from outside amid policy risks..Sign up for your early morning brew of the BizNews Insider to keep you up to speed with the content that matters. The newsletter will land in your inbox at 5:30am weekdays. Register here.Support South Africa’s bastion of independent journalism, offering balanced insights on investments, business, and the political economy, by joining BizNews Premium. Register here.If you prefer WhatsApp for updates, sign up to the BizNews channel here..By Dave Steward.The decision of John Steenhuisen to step down as the DA leader - but to continue as Minister of Agriculture in the Government of National Unity – may be an appropriate moment to assess the success so far of the GNU. In doing so, it might be useful to consider the successes and failures of the first Government of National Unity.According to FW de Klerk, the first GNU worked quite well during 1994. The National Party was able to play a constructive role in ensuring that the government’s development programmes (the RDP and GEAR) would be funded responsibly and that school governing bodies would play a leading role in assuring the right to mother tongue education. NP-appointed Ministers of Finance – first Derek Keys and then Chris Liebenberg - made major contributions to the continuation of fiscally responsible policies. However, the honeymoon ended on 18 January 1995 when President Mandela launched a blistering personal attack on De Klerk at a cabinet meeting. De Klerk seriously considered withdrawal from the GNU, but Mandela, with his characteristic charm, succeeded in papering over the growing fissures in what was, after all, an artificial coalition.It had by that time become clear that NP ministers and deputy-ministers had very little authority in the portfolios they had been given. Ministerial titles and committee chairmanships turned out to be window dressing; the reality was that the policy direction of all departments was determined overwhelmingly by the ANC..Read more:.ANC brains trust rejects reforms, says GNU temporary pitstop to make breathing space.The problem was that there was no coalition agreement on the overall course that the ANC-led GNU would follow, despite repeated pleas by the NP for the negotiation of such an agreement. According to De Klerk, “this led to the untenable position where we were at one and the same time part of the government, as well as the government’s main opposition, attacking it in public. The inevitable result was that both roles suffered.”By May 1996 De Klerk had concluded that the NP’s position within the GNU was untenable: “President Mandela clearly had no intention of allowing me or the NP to play a constructive role. Our anomalous position within the GNU was also beginning to have a very negative effect on our party. Most of the members of our caucus and most of our grassroots supporters wanted the party and its leaders to play a more vigorous and unambiguous opposition role....On the other hand, most of the ministers believed that the NP could continue to exert much more positive influence behind the scenes within the power structures of the GNU than they would be able to from the opposition benches.”All this came to a head following the adoption of the final constitution on 8 May 1996. The NP decided that it would have to reconsider its membership of the GNU because the ANC had refused to accept its modest (but critically important for its supporters) proposals for a continuing power-sharing process. De Klerk favored immediate withdrawal to enable the party to develop its opposition role in the run-up to the 1999 elections. Most of the NP ministers wanted the NP to stay in the GNU – but reluctantly accepted De Klerk’s position – which was strongly supported by the NP caucus.There are, of course, many differences between GNU I and GNU II. The positions of the NP and De Klerk within the first GNU were not dependent on the approval of the ANC – they were mandated by the Constitution. The DA’s membership of GNU II arose from the ANC’s failure to achieve a majority in the 2024 election and its decision to opt for a coalition with the DA and other parties – rather than a “doomsday coalition” with the MK and the EFF. The DA entered the coalition on the basis of a jointly agreed “Statement of Intent” which inter alia committed parties to tackle “the triple challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality...” GNU II would be based on constitutional principles including “non-racialism and non-sexism, social justice, redress and equity and the alleviation of poverty.” It would strive for social cohesion and nation building. Parties would work together “in good faith and seek to build consensus on the formation of a government where no party has an outright majority and would cooperate with each other in respect of executive and/or legislature activities to advance their shared goals”.It was on this basis that the DA boarded the SS GNU II. As with all politicians, they relished the prospect of executive office. Most of the DA ministers and deputy ministers performed well: the parts of the vessel for which they were responsible functioned well: the brass was polished, and the decks were clean.However, some months into the voyage the DA officers noticed, with growing concern, that Captain Ramaphosa was not steering the vessel in the direction indicated by the Statement of Intent. Instead of adopting policies that would address the triple crisis of poverty, unemployment and inequality he was increasing his speed in the direction of the race-based policies of BBBEE and expropriation without compensation that had caused the triple crisis in the first place - and that promised no hope whatsoever of promoting economic growth, social cohesion and national unity.Far from parties “cooperating with each other in respect of executive and legislature activities”, the DA officers found that they were barred from the bridge. The ANC was treating them with undisguised contempt. It did not see the GNU as a bona fide attempt to achieve multi-party consensus but rather as “a contested site of struggle in which the strategic leadership of the ANC is critical”. In the ANC’s view the GNU was simply “a “tactical intervention” to safeguard “the core progressive policy agenda of the National Democratic Revolution.” This is the dilemma that now confronts the DA: like De Klerk, they find that their party is increasingly associated with policies (including the Foot and Mouth Disease imbroglio) that are unacceptable to their supporters. Departments for which they are responsible are, whether they like it or not, implementing some ANC racial policies. DA membership of the GNU has not given the party any effective say in the catastrophic course on which GNU II has embarked - while it is limiting its role to oppose vociferously GNU policies with which it disagrees. The common threads between GNU I and GNU II are the lack of a proper coalition agreement; the ANC’s determination to pursue its own ideological course at any cost; the confinement of its coalition partners in a gilded cage where they have little say in the direction of government; the danger of coalition partners being increasingly associated with unacceptable ANC race-based policies; and the limitation that membership of the GNU places on their ability to play an unconstrained opposition role..Read more:.John Matisonn: DA finally gets the GNU deal it wanted.And so, the SS GNU II continues its lunatic course toward the rocks. Most South Africans and the business community want the DA to stay on board – but it is trapped: does it wait until the ANC decides to make it walk the plank? Does it abandon ship and leave the vessel in the hands of the ANC together with MK perhaps? Or does it wait for the ship to hit the rocks?