Voters had sent a clear message, Frans Cronje told Alec Hogg, and the people who most needed to hear it were looking the other way. Two weeks after the ANC fell below 31%, the SRF chairman explained why he believed the party's executive had never truly backed the GNU, how a plan to splinter the DA from inside government had backfired on the ANC instead, and why a deal with ActionSA, the EFF and MK made sense to many in the ANC even if it hurt the country. He warned that investors had been complacent, gave his reasons why South Africa would absorb the shock better than it would have in 2024, and made an unexpected case for the DA's long-term interest in keeping the ANC alive. He also named the one partnership he believed could still hold the union together, and the price ANC leaders would have to pay to make it happen..Listen here.Edited transcript of the interview.Alec Hogg (00:05) Three weeks ago, five days before the 4 November election, Dr Frans Cronje told us that Wednesday, when we went to the polls, would be another step in the process of regime change. The voters took that step. The ANC fell from 45% to under 31%. The DA rose a couple of percentage points to 25%, only six percentage points between the two. But the politicians aren't listening to the voters, or so it seems.The DA came first in Gauteng, in the three metros. Yet the ANC is looking for partners elsewhere, everywhere it seems, except the DA. And while this is all going on, the president is in Silicon Valley with a group of 300, including three of the coolest heads in the ANC's negotiating process. Frans Cronje is the chairman of the Social Research Foundation, and he's also editor of The Common Sense.Welcome back, Frans. What surprised you, if anything, in the vote?Frans Cronje (01:11) Not much. I think it's pretty close to what the estimates were. No one forecast it, because no one did tracking polls in the end, but the final results and the estimates were pretty much on track. So I don't think there was much of a surprise in the vote itself. The ANC's descent continued.If you go back 20 years of local government elections, the ANC has given up two thirds of its support in metro South Africa and half of its support outside metro South Africa.Alec Hogg I mean, that's pretty devastating.Frans Cronje (02:07) I mean, it's hard. He inherited it at 57%; it's now at 31%. It's very rough, I think. The investment rate, which is really the measure of whether the much-touted reforms amounted to much, is lower than it was when he started.The rate of economic growth: more than 100 emerging markets will grow at four and a half percent this year, all led, one must remember, by politicians. We'll do 1%. I don't know why he's in California, but people who would know him better use the words "he's opted out".Alec Hogg (03:04) That's quite rough for the country.Frans Cronje (03:05) Maybe.Frans Cronje (03:08) Well, I would think so, that you would be here at this time. And it's also peculiar that you've gone to a tech investment conference where you've attracted headlines more than anything for further criticism of Elon Musk, who runs the one major tech firm that has been trying to invest in South Africa at an enormous scale, but the government that accompanied you on your trip has stopped it.When you layer that on top of the moment in South Africa now, it's a strange thing to do.Alec Hogg (04:01) Frans, you came into the media world with The Common Sense to make sense of South Africa. This is your game. Help us make sense of what the heck is going on here. The ANC getting back together with MK and the EFF, facilitated, ostensibly, by a person who said he'd never work with the ANC and who has been so insulted by Julius Malema of the EFF that you just have to believe some of that residue has got to be there: being called a dunderhead and all kinds of other awful things. I'm talking here about Mr Mashaba. So help us make sense. What the heck is going on?Frans Cronje (04:43) I don't know, Alec, what decision they're ultimately going to take, because we have a high standard for knowing. Knowing means it's corroborated by a series of very well-placed people. We don't have that. You always need a lot of doubt. It's the best thing in an analyst, constantly doubting.From that, you can produce an estimate, and our estimate of what is happening is this. It's in various parts. Number one, the ANC's National Executive Committee never endorsed the GNU with the DA. In 2024 they gave a small group of negotiators, who were quite pragmatic, a broad mandate and said, go and do a deal, late at night after a long, uncomfortable meeting with insufficient food and water and the air conditioning turned to an uncomfortable level, as any good political operator would know to do. They then went off and talked to everyone, because that was their mandate, and they had the good fortune in some respects, I think the pragmatists saw it that way, of MK and the EFF saying, we will not join this if the DA is in. And they said, deal, done.They set off with it, and for some time beyond that the ANC very much dragged its feet on scheduling executive committee meetings, I think in part for fear of facing a committee that might have said, what is it that you've done? So that's number one: the ANC has not necessarily changed its mind on anything.Number two, when they did the deal in 2024, the ANC did it confident that they were still, in practice, in charge. They still ran the government; the policies were essentially ANC policies. The DA was very accommodating. Most of the patronage sources would be intact.Frans Cronje (07:03) The DA only had a handful of ministries, and the directors-general were still there, as we now see again with education, I believe suing their minister today, who tried to stop the textbook business. So the ANC said, we can do this deal with the DA. We still have control of politics, we're still seen as who's in charge, and we still have patronage.The third thing at play is that at a certain level in the ANC, the GNU wasn't about reform. It was about splintering the DA. The thought was, well, let's bring them in and then start giving them poisoned chalices and obstructing them: ministers with directors-general who are appointed by the president, not by the DA.So the basic education minister gets BELA, the Basic Education Laws Amendment Act, which upset a lot of the DA's base, and is told to implement it. The broader cabinet moved further on expropriation. And when Malatsi, the communications minister, tries to do something with Starlink, he gets countermanded firmly; the parliamentary committee tells him, no, you can't do that. The idea there was to demonstrate to the DA's voters, firstly, that the DA was prepared to countenance policies, or at least be in a government that drove policies, wholly at odds with the interests of DA voters, and that the DA was weak and pathetic. And the hope was that this would splinter the DA.The Freedom Front would grow as the Afrikaners got fed up and went there; the coloured voters in the DA would get fed up and go to the PA; and the black voters in the DA would get fed up and say these people are hopeless and go to ActionSA. Come today, the ANC would have consolidated nicely. The DA would be down to 15%, let's say, and the ANC would be theFrans Cronje (09:27) only serious political party, even if it didn't have a majority. I think that plan did exist, and as a consequence getting into the GNU made further sense to the ANC. But quite the opposite has happened. The ANC has splintered. It lost 25 percentage points in black voting districts in this election.And it lost only five of those to the DA. It lost all the rest to ActionSA, MK, the PA, not quite the Freedom Front but almost there. So one of the reasons why it was tolerable to have the DA in has fallen away completely. The DA is not splintering; it's consolidating Europe.Further, let's just think of the metros. If proportionality applies, and there's a very good reason that it should, what you bring into the marriage determines your share of the executive committee of the council, the mayoral committee. The ANC would have control in the metros only of East London and Bloemfontein.And that would be an undignified position to be in. You'd look weak and pathetic.And as you go through that kind of list of things,Frans Cronje (11:06) you can start to see that doing a deal with ActionSA, and then drafting in MK and the EFF and the PA and the UDM where you need them, in some places, actually makes a degree of sense. I've just come off an investor call. An investor said, well, this doesn't make sense, this deal, if this is it; it's bad for the country. And I said, but the business we're talking about is the business of politics. The bottom line can be much shorter term.I actually made the point on this call that it would have been in Mr Trump's best interest to get out of Iran in June, but he didn't. He went back after almost getting out, and compounded the damage suffered. It would have been in Mr Trump's interests, after he'd dealt with the southern border, to leave it there, but the thing was taken too far, and by the time ICE agents were shooting American citizens in the streets of American cities, what had been such a positive was undone. Political leaders do counterproductive things in pursuit of short-term objectives, whatever those are. So that's how you make sense of this. You must try and make sense of it. You asked this very well.Alec Hogg (12:34) Mm-hmm.Frans Cronje (12:35) Why does it make sense to do this? In the short term, for a lot of ANC people, it does. And then they'll give you the further argument that maybe if we do this, we can reunite the alliance. We can chew Herman up and spit him out and stomp all over him. His growth was so exponential; it's actually quite dangerous when you do that as a party. You much prefer to grow steadily, as opposed to the spike that he had. He's useful now to have in the camp, but we can stomp all over him later and deal with him. And then we could unite the Charterists, all our splinters, the parties that have their origins in the Freedom Charter. We can bring the family back together. We can be strong again and united, and we can again be dominant in the future South Africa.That's one of the ideas that underpins this kind of thinking and approach, and it has a logic to it. It might not be in the national interest, or in the long-term best interest of the ANC. I think they're wrong on the ability to unite the Charterists. But there is a logic and a reason to it, and it appears at this time that that isAlec Hogg (13:57) Sure.Frans Cronje (14:00) gaining the upper hand in the internal debate.Alec Hogg (14:04) And the rand is showing us that people who should be investing here are taking the same view. The rand, just after the results started coming through, was just over 16 to the dollar. Now it's above 17 to the dollar. I know the US dollar has been strong, but not that strong. So on that investor call, did those who were talking to you leave thinking, mm, there is a logic to this, and it might actually be the ANC-type logic that prevails?Frans Cronje (14:40) The dollar has moved, which accounts for a significant degree of what we've seen in the rand. I'll tell you a very interesting thing. For the last year or so we've been going around as a firm saying to clients, and this is one of the things we do: we try to think on clients' behalf about things that could come down the line that you're not thinking about. We said, South Africa is very aggressively priced.Just for people who might not dwell in this world all the time, there's a thing called the yield differential. It's the difference between the South African 10-year bond yield and that in the United States. The differential will always be higher in South Africa, because if you leave the dollar to invest in South Africa, you want some compensation for the risk you take.That yield differential increased sharply after 2008, and then it remained at that level. It spiked in Covid and came back to the post-2008 moving average. And then, after the GNU was formed, the differential came steeply down. The market really liked it. It came all the way down to the level it had last held between 2004 and 2007.That was when the economy had grown at 5%, there'd been an actual budget surplus as opposed to just a primary surplus, Thabo Mbeki was superficially in command and the ANC was completely dominant. And the question we put to clients was, do you not think there's a country pricing risk? And they'd say, why do you think that? And we'd say, well, this election and its potential implications. We knew there were tensions in the GNU. Society had convinced itself that the ANC's executive, the board, had backed this GNU, which it had never really done. We said, we don't know if it's going to happen, but maybe this GNU breaks up. People were quite surprised that we would say that at all, and obviously we were serious. They said, well, it's certainly something to think about, but it hadn't been on their radar. So I think there's been quite a lot of complacency running into this election.Frans Cronje (16:55) I think there was a complacency that a weaker ANC is good for South Africa. I certainly saw that in the investment world: as the ANC weakens, the DA gets stronger; that's a net positive, and it justifies the pricing. When actually it might force the ANC to reassess the whole thing. The second was that Mr Ramaphosa is always there; he's a big GNU champion. Well, my understanding is that he's spoken quite strongly against continuing the GNU with the DA now. So that doesn't necessarily hold, and therefore I think there is a bit of a misalignment on pricing.On the call now, we discussed it, and what people who actually do this for a living said is that at the moment there's just been a lot of speculation, a lot of noise, but no information. They'll move on the facts. And one of those facts would be the second-order effects. Is fiscal prudence ultimately compromised? Does this mean a return to aggressive expropriation, NHI and the like, if you've got a populist administration now? The pragmatists, I must tell you, feel a bit disheartened this month, and have done for a few days.Alec Hogg (18:22) Sure.Frans Cronje (18:22) Do you see some repricing on SA? I think you might in the short term. But remember, Alec, in 28 months' time we're going to have another election.From a strategic, short-term point of view, I understand what some in the ANC are trying to do. But in the long term I think they're taking a hell of a risk, because they're putting themselves and all their colleagues in a box, and they're going to try and govern, and I don't think they're going to succeed to any great extent. I don't think they're going to achieve much by way of an economic turnaround; sentiment won't allow that, nor would they be inclined to alter sentiment.They are all parties that fish in the same pond, you must remember. The DA and the ANC fish in different ponds: the middle-class pond and the not-middle-class pond. These are all in the not-middle-class pond. They're going to tear each other to pieces. And the DA can actually sit back, if it wishes to, if this is what's going to happen. And I've told you I don't know what's going to happen; we're estimating things. The DA could actually sit back and say, well, if you insist on doing this, we'll just stomp on the box for the next 28 months and then meet you in 2029, when the DA would have a reasonable prospect of winning Gauteng outright and emerging as the biggest party in the country.Alec Hogg (19:56) That takes long-term perspectives, which don't seem to be involved when you look at the other side of the coin. And there I'm particularly talking about Herman Mashaba, who does appear to be changing his mind on a lot of things now that he's got some pretty strong cards to play, and may be wanting to be the mayor of Johannesburg. He told me, Frans, last Monday, immediately after the election, on BizNews TV: take Helen Zille off the table and I will go off the table as well, and we will work with the DA. We want to work with the DA. We like them. All the reports we're getting now are that no, they don't want to work with the DA, even though it has been speculated that Geordin Hill-Lewis would go in and be the mayoral candidate. Nope, he is not acceptable to ActionSA. They seem to have played it quite well post-2024. But now, going into 2029, is getting into bed with the ANC not a poisoned chalice for them?Frans Cronje (21:11) I think it might well be. I wouldn't think the ANC has their best interests at heart. Mr Mashaba speaks his mind, and the rude things he's said about the DA are only exceeded by the rude things he's said about the ANC. And he's certainly not seen as a member of the Charterist, inside, liberation-era sort of brotherhood.I don't think his new bedfellows, if he does pursue this further, are going to have his best interests at heart. They want those votes back, above all. He didn't take the DA's votes; he took the ANC's. They'll want them back. And they have done very well.But they grew very steeply. It was exponential over a couple of weeks. You must be very careful about that, because that's a bit of an emotional response to something in some very particular places and areas. It's in a sense safer to see nice, gradual growth off a base that you understand, that's slowly buying into your message. The steep stuff can be risky. You can give it up at the same rate that you gained it. But he's done terribly well, and he may well negotiate his way into control of, well, at least nominal control of, Pretoria and Johannesburg. He could be the mayor of Johannesburg. I think that's plausible now.I don't think the ANC is going to give them executive authority on the mayco. They're going to retain that, if they do this, probably with these EFF-type partners and the like.Alec Hogg (23:19) I've got to ask you about the EFF, because Julius Malema has been terribly insulting. Whatever Herman Mashaba has said about the ANC or the DA pales next to what Malema has said about Mashaba. Why would he not be taking that as big a slight as he apparently has from Helen Zille?Frans Cronje (23:33) What?Frans Cronje (23:39) I know. There are some mysteries of the world that I'll never understand, and you're leading me into one of those. I don't understand. Someone said something to me, a very clever chap,Alec Hogg (23:44) Yeah.Frans Cronje (23:55) about the choice that the ANC is now making. I just thought of it now. He said, if you're the ANC, do you really want to make this choice? You get these volatile, impulsive partners on the one hand; you get MK on the other hand. Those are serious guys; they're going to demand their pound of flesh and more.And you're going to invite these in, and they fish in the same pond as you do, and they shut the door on your chances of an economic recovery. And you've decided this is what you want above Geordin Hill-Lewis, who will stick to the terms of any agreement, behave like a gentleman with decency, try to be helpful, and bring in many of the skills you need to improve local government. But your choice is to say no to that and embrace this instead.This is not the choice of a movement that's thinking terribly far ahead, necessarily. It's similar to where you were headed with this.Alec Hogg (25:04) You've done a lot of research, and a lot of what comes out of the Social Research Foundation tells us that voters want the ANC and the DA to work together, as in the Government of National Unity, and presumably also at metro level. By sending out the signals they are sending out now, from the ANC's side, are they, as you've said before, the elites getting in the way of what the voters want? And if they do so, what might the retribution look like when those same voters get an opportunity to go to the ballot again? Or will they just give up?Frans Cronje (25:48) You know that two thirds of voters, it's more than that, I think 68% overall, and more than two thirds of black and white voters and of ANC and DA voters, want the two parties to work together if neither one is at 50%. If you just pause for a moment and think what that means, it's a wonderful thing. It means that South Africans can, in a moment, get past a lot of the ideological, political, socioeconomic and historical divides. That makes us quite unique. That's not as easily true in America. It's not as easily true in much of Europe now. It's not true in the Middle East. Israel's just had an election; America's just had one. It's a wonderful thing, and it's being ignored.It's probably the most powerful countervailing force in favour of our long-term success, and it's been ignored because short-term interests are trumping national interest and long-term strategy. And what is the short-term interest? In the end, it's that if you do the deal with the DA now, then just in the metros you are surrendering billions of rands in patronage.Frans Cronje (27:17) Think about that. Let's say you and I were told, and let's say it was true, which it is, that South Africa would succeed if both of us gave up everything we've worked for, our businesses and careers, and accepted poverty. And let's say that was true.That's really what's being asked of many in the leadership of the ANC. By doing this DA deal, you're going to upend a lot of the patronage networks, and a lot of those exist at local government level.And the people who've benefited from those are not going back to their law firms and family businesses or whatever. This is the business. Therefore they're being asked to do something that is almost impossible for any person to agree to. I mean, you should; it's unethical, obviously, not to. And how do you deal with that? Well, you need strong executive leadership that says, this is what we will do, and if you oppose that, you'll be prosecuted for whatever scams you run out of your office in whichever municipality you've got yourself into. But the executive leader is in California this weekend.Frans Cronje (28:48) And there you can see it again. So yes, why would you ignore something as amazing as that? What a thing for South Africa. Two thirds of black and white, ANC and DA voters say, in the instant that you ask them that question: yes, we will work with each other to make it work. Why do you ignore that? You ignore it because the short-term interests are so overwhelming, because the corruption got to a point where it became the livelihood of a lot of influential political actors in the country.Alec Hogg (29:29) Before the 2024 election, you spoke about the Chernobyl option, an option which, from the conversation we've had, is looking increasingly likely for the metros in the richest part of the country. Is it going to be as debilitating as it would have been in 2024 for MK, the EFF and the ANC to get together?Frans Cronje (29:58) I don't think so. Had it happened in that moment in 2024, it would have been an immense shock. Remember, people were still sceptical about our data that the ANC would get to 40% and that MK would be so important and dominant. Had you gone straight from ANC dominance to that in a flash, it would have been so shocking and unsettling that the bond market reaction, which is where the trouble would have come in, and capital flight would have been devastating to South Africa, and set in motion a deeply negative spiral that's hard to escape from. The past two years have been a sort of shock absorber.What has also become much more pronounced over time, in the last two years and particularly post-Covid, very much so, is this enclave formation business. South Africans have become accustomed to that, and quite comfortable in it, in fact. We speak about it a lot, so I suppose people speak to us about it, but I encounter it often. It's a view that says, in the end, that even if the politics is disappointing and counterproductive at times,Frans Cronje (31:28) we have organically begun to develop, and have now increasingly developed, options: living arrangements and business arrangements that allow the capital base, the tax base and so on to stay within the country through periods, even extended periods, of political instability. That's been very reassuring.Another factor at play in the public mind going into 2024 was that people thought it was incredibly important who sat in the Union Buildings. Remember what that used to be like. Who would the president be? It was a definitive thing. If it was a good guy, we could stay in the country; if it was a bad guy, we'd have to go. The effect of the period after 2024, and the run-up to it, has been that even if the ANC is not in command, even if the president is underwhelming, even if the government is not fantastic, actually it is held together because of these enclaves.So I'd say that in the two and a half years or so since 2024, the country has adjusted to a point where this kind of shock will be absorbed. There'll be some repricing and whatever; it won't attract as much investment. The right people will be on calls to their advisers saying, are you sure we have enough offshore? There'll be some of that. But I think society has been immunised to an extent that if it were to happen this time, it won't have nearly the shock effect of the doomsday prophecies of two and a half and three years ago.Alec Hogg (33:22) Would it accelerate the balkanisation, though, which was the alternative?Frans Cronje (33:25) Definitely. Definitely. One of the things this also does is that if the ANC now goes this way, its odds of picking a compelling successor to Mr Ramaphosa are lower. Now, we've been out on a limb on the Motsepe thing, and we're still on that limb. A compelling figure, maybe him, maybe someone else, but he's the only one we really have on the list, would already have such a hard time fixing the ANC.Even if the GNU held and had been extended to local government level, with Hill-Lewis you can basically shake the chap's hand and be certain he's going to stick to the deal. These others you're going to govern with, you can sign a contract and be sure they're going to set it alight the minute you leave the office.The way we've put it to people is that if the ANC goes this way, to put things gently, we will have to write down the Motsepe prospects and the ANC reform prospects. So that's another door they're shutting on themselves by going for this decision, if they do. And as I said, I don't know what they're going to do; I'm estimating that this is what they're likely to do.Alec Hogg (34:45) Let's end on a maybe happier note. Let's just say that Herman Mashaba has been playing a game, negotiating for the best possible deal, and he does a deal with the DA. And between ActionSA and the DA, they manage to put aside their differences and govern those three big councils, the three big metros in Gauteng. What's the upside there? What might the impact of that be for South Africa?Frans Cronje (35:20) You'd think so, yes. But I don't, because I think something else.ActionSA and the DA, if you get them together, cover 6% of the country's municipalities, and you've now kicked the ANC out. You've banished it to the wilderness, literally. And I worry about the second-order effects of that: that the ANC, humiliated, abandoned and alienated, radicalises to a very extreme extent, and its supporters too, and we regret the consequences. My sense of it has been that, in as far as it is possible at all, you should do everything to ensure that the ANC remains a viable partner for the DA in the fullness of time.Because the DA's voters are middle-class voters,Frans Cronje (36:21) and the ANC's voters are not. They're aspirant middle-class voters, both the younger ones and the older ones, vicariously through their children in the cities. And if you want South Africa to work as a whole, the union, which we want to have and believe in (we do the enclave thing because we're forced into it, but we actually want the union to succeed), the only deal that gives you a political majority is a deal between the middle classes and the aspirant middle class.That gives you 60% of a political deal. And the deal works really well, because policies that ensure a future for the middle class are policies that create an aspirant middle class. You've got different voters in different ponds, so you're not fighting with each other as if you were in the same pond, but your policies are so close to each other that they're virtually indistinguishable.If you go and do an alternative deal now, to an extent you write down the prospects of that, and I think in doing so you actually write down the prospects of the union. So, and your viewers must forgive me, it might be, if you do cold-blooded strategy, best to keep open the option of doing that deal with the ANC in the fullness of time, because it's the only one you've got.I've had this debate with a few people now, and they might say the ANC is a useless thing, look at it now, we should destroy it. And my point to them is: then with whom will you negotiate? Or do you propose that the middle classes in suburbia govern South Africa on their own? I don't think that's very easy to do. So I don't actually support these smaller side deals, the DA and the Freedom Front in Pretoria. I think they have second-order effects. And I think the wiser thing to do, if the DA is going to be faced with this,Frans Cronje (38:29) is, and they would do any deal, I think, they're good guys, but they're forced now not to, they don't have an option: go into opposition for a time, 28 months to the next election, and let's look at the prospects by then. There is this band of pragmatists in the ANC; they have many options open to them if they choose to take some of those.Because this is the only deal that works. As I said, 6.6% of municipalities are covered by ActionSA and the DA; the DA and the ANC cover 77% of municipalities and 80% of the population. And that is a very good and stabilising thing. The ANC can come to understand, perhaps, that its voters' interests are the same as the DA's voters' interests, and that the voters, of course, support this deal. I think that thing is still in reach. We must certainly work towards it very hard, because that's the way we'll save the union of South Africa. But again, if we don't, or we can't, if it doesn't work, then you fall back into enclaves. And I maintain that enclaves offer a very long and prosperous future to South Africa's upper middle classes, who live in great splendour and comfort regardless of the instability of the politics.Alec Hogg (40:02) Frans, my last question on this, on what's still within reach: how strong are those who've been funding these parties, which would clearly be the business community and others? How strong is their voice in all of this? The ANC has got to fund its party; the DA has got to fund its operations. How well will that voice be listened to, and what does it want?Frans Cronje (40:30) Well, remember, the biggest funding that goes into parties is from taxpayers. The parties split about two billion rand between them every year. And the Party Funding Act limits private donations, in practice, to 15 million rand a year. There are not many private donors around, so private donations are not particularly influential, at least the declared, listed, legal ones. Goodness knows what goes on in the shadows. I mean, this whole Act was written for this very purpose: to cut funding to legitimate parties, while if you're already an illegitimate entity, essentially a front for a criminal enterprise, you might as well fund yourself illicitly as well, from the proceeds. Regrettably, what the Party Funding Act actually does is give illicit actors enormous influence over politics, and give good, legitimate, decent business people much reduced influence, because they can only give quite a modest amount if they're very wealthy, and they have to have their name plastered around the press. Many people, for good reason, prefer to live a private life, not because they have anything to hide. You don't want to be pestered by people asking you to fund this and that and the next thing.So I think we've ended up in the perverse position where illicit actors fund politics and have great sway, and the illicit actors have almost none, by the same means.Alec Hogg (42:08) Unintended consequences, which possibly isFrans Cronje (42:10) Well, intended consequences. Intended consequences. In this case, I will tell you, intended consequences. Maybe there were useful idiots who backed it, but intended consequences.Alec Hogg (42:18) Uh-huh.Alec Hogg (42:25) I'm feeling a bit depressed listening to you, but I guess you've got to take a long view. Frans Cronje (42:30) Look, I don't feel compelled to give upsides, but I still see this. I think the ANC is making a strategic mistake. And if it insists on doing that, then let it. There's nothing that can be done. If an effort has been mounted to convince it otherwise, I don't know if that effort's going to succeed.But if it's going to make a strategic mistake, then let it. It will weaken itself and its standing. It will strengthen the alternatives. We are a fundamentally free and open society, where you can say what you like and you don't get dragged away in the middle of the night, and that's probably not going to change in the next 28 months; it's quite complicated to change that. And these guys are after the loot in the short term, not some great ideological venture to bring about some different road to civil rights culture.Public opinion is, as I've said, wonderful. It's a wonderful thing. We are so fortunate that people are so good and decent and together. And this has the prospect of uniting them more, if we keep a very close watch on the divisive voices and the hate-mongering media and don't let them do what they've been doing for so many years: trying to turn South Africans against each other. This is our most important asset.On energy, we have more than enough in the defunct coal fleet to enable an economic growth rate of 4% or 5% for the next decade, just from an energy perspective. People say you can't get ahead, you just don't have the electricity. We actually do. It's right there.Frans Cronje (44:30) The skills within the South African economy, the entrepreneurs: we're going to retain the capital base that's already here. It's already in an enclave; that's why it's here. We're going to retain it, the entrepreneurial base, much of the employment base. That's going to be kept. Sometimes I'm asked to look into and advise on other parts of the world, and you don't have this. The basic infrastructure doesn't exist; it was bombed out of existence or never built. The society is utterly radicalised into two warring camps that wish to do each other harm, so you first have to change that before you can get to a political solution. You can't develop a political solution because if you criticise the leader, you go to prison. There aren't any natural resources. If you want skills, you've got to either repatriate the diaspora or attract them from the rest of the world.We're still in a very strong position here. And all that has now been added to the deck, to the hand we've been dealt, is that one of the major actors has probably made a serious strategic mistake, because they're chasing short-term loot and patronage at the expense of long-term strategy. And if that can be exploited, not necessarily to do the ANC harm, but to strengthen the hand of these good, pragmatic guys who are around, who have very bravely said in their own camp, you're all crazy and this will be the death of us if you do this. It's actually, as ever, never that difficult to play South Africa's hand in a way that determines long-term success. Despite this, I don't think that has fundamentally changed from the kind of conversations you and I had a month ago, six months ago and two years ago.Alec Hogg (46:45) Dr Frans Cronje, always insightful, always with the kind of thought-provoking views that help us to understand South Africa better. He is the editor of The Common Sense, and of course also one of our most esteemed commentators here on BizNews. Thanks again, Frans, for your time. And I'm Alec Hogg with your Business Edge.Frans Cronje (47:07) Thanks, Alec..Sign up for your early morning brew of the BizNews Insider to keep you up to speed with the content that matters. The newsletter will land in your inbox every morning on weekdays. Register here.Support South Africa's bastion of independent journalism, offering balanced insights on investments, business, and the political economy, by joining BizNews Premium. Register here.If you prefer WhatsApp for updates, sign up to the BizNews channel here.