History is written by the victors. Always has been, and probably always will be. In that respect Riaan Eksteen, a 30 year veteran of the old South African Foreign Service, was on the wrong side. But he still tells a compelling and well documented tale. Although best known through his four years as head of the SABC in the mid-1980s, Eksteen was also intimately involved in the birth of Namibia, SA’s sparsely populated north western neighbour. In this superbly researched reflection, he revisits global events which sparked the draining “Border War” – and highlights efforts of a largely unheralded hero whose example paved the path for South Africa’s peaceful transition to democracy. – Alec Hogg
By Riaan Eksteen*
In the two months from mid-July to mid-September 1966, four events shook South Africa (SA). These inevitably spilt over into South West Africa (SWA, then under SA mandate but now the independent state of Namibia). The events had an immediate personal impact on many, and then coalesced to form the basis of the future fate of both nations. They redefined the geopolitical environment in southern Africa for both.
After fifty years, some historical perspective is essential – particularly since a tendency has arisen to overwrite or redefine the sequence of events that precipitated major change in the ultimate fate of apartheid, its territorial reach, and what led to its abolition.
For SWA there were direct connections between what occurred. Firstly, the decision of the International Court of Justice on 18 July 1966 to circumscribe SA’s mandate over SWA triggered the inception of the South West Africa Peoples’ Organisation, SWAPO, and its armed struggle for independence (on 26 August 1966).
Simple termination of the mandate was not a matter for the Court to decide. However, had the ruling gone against SA on the arguments by Ethiopia and Liberia — that they had a right to pursue the issue — then the next step would have been to get the Security Council (SC) to force SA into relinquishing its mandate. The effect was that they could not ask the SC for enforcement. Everything then turned into a political game against SA in the General Assembly while the SC itself never took any action against SA on SWA.
This mandate had history: it had effectively been decided at the Versailles Peace Conference after SA captured SWA territory during World War 1; but as the decolonisation spirit took hold during and after World War 2, SA’s sway over SWA came increasingly into question, though inevitably resisted by Pretoria.
For many South Africans, this is the immediate backdrop to what is termed the “Border War”, the second event of major regional significance. (And which in turn accentuated internal resistance to apartheid.)
Before focusing on what might have been a far worse scenario than the real developments, as we know them today, it is imperative to recall two other occurrences of equal historical significance. They were again interconnected – and had a severe impact on SA’s own political development; but, as importantly, on that country’s approach to international affairs and more specifically its handling of the SWA issue.
On 6 September 1966 Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, then Prime Minister of SA, was assassinated in Parliament by a psychotic whose actions, he said, were dictated by a huge internal tapeworm. A week later Verwoerd was succeeded by his Minister of Justice, John Vorster, who subsequently framed his own policies towards Africa. These included a more conciliatory definition of the SWA issue — and actual engagement with leaders in the disputed territory. He did not, however, engage with SWAPO.
This fresh vision encouraged certain internal SWA leaders to become more involved with each other; and from that an idea took firm root – designated the Prime Minister’s Advisory Council on SWA. Established in 1974 it saw the internal leaders meet jointly for the first time. The Turnhalle initiative followed afterwards in 1975-1977, an SA-monitored constitutional conference named after the historic building chosen to house it.
Taken together, these developments brought SA face to face with the new internal SWA leaders, and here Dirk Mudge made a considerable impression, though in the final analysis he considered and chose his own way. But SA/SWA had entered a realm of unplumbed realities. The entire SWA issue became a greater focal point in SA’s foreign policy than ever before. It was now seen and evaluated through the prism of rapidly changed and changing circumstances and caused SA to realise that – even disregarding its internal policies – its international standing would remain fragile (and subject to world condemnation) if the SWA issue was not resolved with international approval.
That equivocal balance held for almost eight years and SA was able to reposition itself as a moderating force on SWA independence. Then came a shocking event. In Angola and Mozambique, the colonial power, Portugal, succumbed to economic over-extension and a geographically enormous expanse of guerrilla pressures. The fateful month was April 1974 after a coup in Lisbon compelled a desire to abandon the colonies.
The upshot was a dark shadow over Angola and SWA for 16 years; and this period of disequilibrium only came to an end when the Cubans (who were there as part of Fidel Castro’s dream of Marxist military brotherhood) withdrew. Angola and Namibia eventually gained independence in 1990.
However, far earlier, in anticipation of the International Court’s decision on the legality of SA’s mandate, the United States (risking and riding the razor’s edge of the Cold War through potentially escalating proxy conflicts) had its own strategies well in preparation. The US was aware that the decision could well be exceptionally negative for SA, and therefore for its own standing in global pre-eminence (should it choose to defy it to prop up its own African dominion). It needed to devise a strategy that would determine what should occur if and when the decision went against SA. Seeing itself as a world moral leader, it was necessary for it to not merely plunge into any ensuing conflict under its own flag. There was also a fear of Western monetary instability.
Little official documentation is available, but SA’s nuclear research programme at that time was fearfully observed from outside – though in the end SA dismantled its actual atomic weapons and became a signatory to various non-proliferation treaties on these and other weapons of mass destruction. This outcome was not anticipated in the 1960s.
America’s position was finalised on the basis of a State Department National Policy Paper approved by Secretary of State Dean Rusk in 1965. In that document the following was recorded: “It now appears likely that the issue over the mandatory status of South-West Africa may soon bring about the first major confrontation looming between the world community and South Africa. This confrontation also has serious implications for the authority of the UN [and] the International Court of Justice. It will bring into sharp focus the potential danger for unilateral action by Communist countries which could jeopardise our long-term interests in Africa.”
Immediately preceding the Court’s ruling, President Lyndon Johnson chaired meetings of his National Security Council (NSC). The International Court case featured prominently on the agenda, and vital decisions with far-reaching consequences were taken. On 14 July 1966 Under-Secretary of State George Ball opined that the Court would “rule against SA on all counts”. In officially released documentation his further assessment was that “after stalling, SA will reject the Court ruling and any UN actions to enforce the ruling. The decision will be a blow to sterling, thus creating a major problem for the British. We must expect that black Africans will try in the UN to get military and economic sanctions against SA.” His conclusion: “We are trying to get SA to accept the Court’s decision when it is handed down.”
Johnson then instructed Rusk “to set up a task force on the SWA problem”. It was to be composed of those officers in State, Defence, Treasury, AID, USIA, CIA, and the NSC Staff  responsible for African Affairs.
One of the options contemplated by the task group was a naval blockade of SA in the event of its noncompliance with the Court decision. A few days after the crucial NSC meeting on SWA, the US Ambassador to SA handed a demarche to the SA Government warning SA to accept the forthcoming judgment. Attention was specifically drawn to Article 94 of the UN Charter in terms of which SA (as a member of the UN) was bound “to comply with the decision” of the Court. Furthermore, if it failed “to perform the obligations incumbent upon it … [the Security Council may] decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.”
Just watched a #documentary about a forgotten war:the south Africa border war it gave amazing insight about the horrors of war
— Qutiabah Harb (@qutiabah55) September 4, 2013
A Security Council decision declaring SA’s presence and administration illegal, and demanding SA withdrawal, was not farfetched. This would have caused a major confrontation: a forcible removal of SA from SWA while it still held legal title to the area and port of Walvis Bay would have caused unthinkable consequences.
Even a voluntary departure would have brought results for which SA and the affected world were ill-prepared. Specifically, it needs to be retrospectively asked: what would the situation on the ground have been if demands for immediate independence were indeed met? The departing SA-appointed Administrator and his administration would have left behind no leadership in a position to maintain the affairs of governance. The then Legislative Assembly — consisting only of whites — would have been anathema to the outside world and a vast majority of the inhabitants.
Those who played a crucial role in bringing Namibia to independence in 1990 and forming its first government were not yet on the scene. There was no leader who could have commanded the respect of and acceptance of the majority of the inhabitants. Sam Nujoma was only starting to spread his wings internally, let alone internationally. Phohamba, Geingob, Gurirab, Katjavivi – to name only a few — had not yet gained prominence. By then Dirk Mudge had only five years of experience in the Legislative Assembly and one year of service as a member of the Executive Council. An independent Namibia in 1966 would have been a disaster.
This perceived imbalance held for decades and exacerbated regional conflicts. However, those years helped forge a leadership cadre within and outside SWAPO that stood Namibia in good stead in the years following 1990.
Dirk Mudge made a quantum leap early in his political outlook. He faced the new realities emerging in his country head on. While he could easily have wandered along the well-trodden path of his fellow white compatriots of those early years, he adjusted.
He did so as he had the foresight with which few in his country – indeed, even in SA — had been endowed and blessed. That leap was that of a visionary: it was calculated. When he acted he could count true supporters on his two hands; yet what he achieved has now been recorded in various publications, including his own.
What is sorely lacking – not so much in Namibia where he is to this day a respected leader, but in SA – is the recognition for his endeavours so tirelessly performed over so many decades. What he pioneered in Namibia was not always well-liked in SA and by its then leaders. Indeed, sometimes there was little to no appreciation for what he wanted to achieve and did achieve against great odds.
He may now be accorded what was formerly denied him by SA – that of a person who made a real difference in his own country. He set an example for his neighbouring state where many of its leaders were hesitant – even fearful – to proceed on a path by then already well-travelled by Mudge.
- Riaan Eksteen was a career diplomat in the old South Africa, including five years as Ambassador to the United Nations ahead of a four year spell, from 1984 to 1988, as the Director General of the SA Broadcasting Corporation. After leaving the SABC he returned to the foreign service, spending two years as SA’s Ambassador to Namibia. Since 1997 he has run his own international consultancy.
