Will the GNU actually halt the ANC’s NDR?: Anthea Jeffery

The ANC's National Democratic Revolution (NDR) seeks to shape South Africa's future through socialist policies, even as the party now governs in a coalition following its 2024 electoral decline. While the GNU offers potential for economic recovery and renewed investment, the ANC's strategic manoeuvring raises questions about its commitment to shared governance. The coalition's longevity may determine whether the NDR advances unchecked or is effectively rolled back to prioritize free-market growth and democratic accountability..Sign up for your early morning brew of the BizNews Insider to keep you up to speed with the content that matters. The newsletter will land in your inbox at 5:30am weekdays. Register here..The seventh BizNews Conference, BNC#7, is to be held in Hermanus from March 11 to 13, 2025. The 2025 BizNews Conference is designed to provide an excellent opportunity for members of the BizNews community to interact directly with the keynote speakers, old (and new) friends from previous BNC events – and to interact with members of the BizNews team. Register for BNC#7 here..By Anthea Jeffery*.In the 30 years since 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) and its allies in the South African Communist Party (SACP), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and elsewhere have made substantial progress in implementing a long-planned National Democratic Revolution (NDR)..The NDR aims at a socialist future for South Africa. It seeks to get there over a period of 30 to 40 years and by largely democratic means, rather than a violent revolution. .Since 1994, the ANC has adopted a host of NDR laws in many different spheres. These aim at hobbling the capitalist economy, eroding confidence in free markets, increasing state control, and promoting dependency on the government for all core needs, from education and housing to healthcare and transport. .For 30 years, the ANC had more than enough seats in Parliament to pass NDR laws by simple (51%) majority. In the May 2024 election, however, it won only 40% of the seats in the National Assembly. It now forms part of a government of national unity (GNU) with nine other political parties, including the market-orientated Democratic Alliance (DA)..Since the GNU assumed power in July 2024, it has had positive effects on the rand, bond yields, interest rates, and business confidence. It has helped rekindle interest in South Africa as a potential investment destination and buttressed hopes of higher growth, more jobs and better state delivery. Does the GNU also mean that the NDR has been defeated and will in time be rolled back?.The ANC's negotiating strategy on the GNU.The ANC seems to have worked out its negotiating strategy on the GNU well in advance. (This is also what it did in the people's war period from 1984 to 1994, when its Moscow mentors helped guide it on how to dominate any constitutional negotiations that might ensue and ensure that its preferred outcomes were achieved.).Following the May 2024 election, President Cyril Ramaphosa was quick to accept its outcomes. He interpreted the results as a mandate for the ANC and other parties to work together and took pains to project an image of pragmatism and moderation. Behind the scenes, however, he also sought to expand the ANC's power and diminish the DA's influence within the GNU..Read more: SA politics at a crossroads: Maja and Maimane speak out on ANC's decline and failing municipalities.Much of this was achieved via the Declaration of Intent agreed by the ANC and the DA on 14 June 2024, the date the Constitution required the election of a new president. The ANC on its own could no longer secure the presidency for Mr Ramaphosa as it had held only 159 seats out of 400 in the National Assembly. The ANC thus persuaded the DA with its 89 seats to vote for Mr Ramaphosa as president and for Thoko Didiza as speaker..The DA agreed to do so in return for the Declaration's rather vague promises of proportionality in cabinet appointments. The Declaration also said that disputes within the GNU would be settled by "sufficient consensus": ie, with the support of GNU parties holding 60% of the seats in the National Assembly. The document added that, whenever new parties wanted to be admitted to the GNU, "the composition [of the coalition] would be discussed and agreed amongst the existing parties"..In practice, however, the safeguards in the Declaration soon withered away. After Mr Ramaphosa had been elected president, the ANC began to emphasise that the Constitution gave him the prerogative to appoint his cabinet as he saw fit – and that this power could not be curtailed by a mere Declaration of Intent..The ANC also claimed that the clause requiring the consent of existing GNU members for the admission of new parties would take effect only after the GNU had been established. Acting on this basis, the ANC soon drew in another seven parties, in addition to the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) whose inclusion had been agreed to from the start. This influx of small parties reduced the ANC's dependence on the DA to remain in power..With ten parties in the GNU, the demand for cabinet posts was enormous. Partly for this reason, Mr Ramaphosa in time opted for a bloated cabinet comprising 34 people. The ANC had 20 ministers, as well as the President and the Deputy-President. This meant it held roughly 65% of all cabinet posts. By contrast, the DA was accorded six cabinet posts out of 34 or some 18%. At the deputy minister level, the ANC held 31 out of 38 posts (roughly 82%), while the DA held five out of 38 (a mere 13%). Yet the DA had won 87 seats in Parliament as against the 159 won by the ANC and should have received many more cabinet posts on a proportional basis. .The "sufficient consensus" requirement was negated too. By the time the GNU took power, the ANC and the various small parties within it – excluding the DA, the IFP, and the Freedom Front Plus – held 62% of the seats in the National Assembly. This meant that the ANC would generally be able to secure the 60% support needed to show "sufficient consensus" for a contested decision. .As political analyst RW Johnson puts it, the ANC "double-crossed the DA". It also neutralised three key gains the DA believed it had achieved. As the DA saw it, the ANC had lost its hegemony, it had accepted the election result, and it had chosen the DA as its key partner. This might have seemed to be the case when the DA signed the Declaration of Intent on 14 June. But by the time Mr Ramaphosa announced his Cabinet on 30 June, these supposed gains had largely evaporated. This signalled that the ANC had not in fact accepted the election outcome. Instead, it had actively worked to bypass it and preserve its capacity for domination..The Declaration of Intent had another defect too, for it constituted no more than "a guide" for tiers of government outside the national one. This proved particularly important in Gauteng, where the DA had won 22 out of 80 seats to the ANC's 28. This gave the two an almost equal number of seats (a ratio of 45 to 55). If Gauteng premier Panyaza Lesufi had allocated positions in the provincial cabinet on a proportional basis, the DA would have had roughly the same number of MECs as the ANC. Instead, Lesufi offered the DA three MEC positions out of ten, which the DA declined to accept. At local government level, a DA-led coalition governing the Tshwane metropole with a narrow majority was soon ousted by the ANC, with the help of a small non-GNU party, ActionSA..These developments suggest that the ANC's aim in setting up the GNU was not only to remain in power but also to keep implementing the NDR. What other evidence is there of this?.The ANC's continued commitment to the NDR.That the ANC remains committed to the NDR was perhaps most clearly evident in October 2024, when it launched a new "foundation course" on political education for its members. One of the primary goals of this course is to "instil a clear commitment to the National Democratic Revolution (NDR)" among all its members, both old and new..In the legislative sphere, Mr Ramaphosa could have declined to give his assent to various controversial bills that had been rushed through Parliament in the months before the May election. Instead, the president has signed into law not only the Basic Education Laws Amendment (BELA) Bill but also the Public Procurement Bill and the Climate Change Bill. The organisation plans to bring the Employment Equity Amendment Act – with its state-mandated racial quotas for private sector employers – into operation on 1 January 2025..In addition, the ANC is pressing ahead with implementing the NHI Act to which Mr Ramaphosa assented in mid-May 2024, a fortnight before the election. This is a particularly damaging statute which the DA had previously vowed to fight in the courts, but which it now cannot easily contest..In September 2024, Mr Ramaphosa acknowledged some of the resistance to the NHI by inviting Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) to provide him with "specific proposals on the remaining issues of concern as a basis for further engagement" on the Act. The president gave BUSA three months for this task. This deadline expires on 19 December 2024..However, this additional consultation with organised business is unlikely to result in any significant changes. With the NHI Act already part of the law, Parliament alone has the power to change it via a suitable amendment bill. In addition, health minister Aaron Motsoaledi has refused to negotiate on the most damaging clause of all (Section 33), which is likely to terminate all medical schemes once the NHI is fully operative. That clause will stay as is, the minister has said, even if this signals the end of the GNU..Whether any real progress has been made on the BELA Act remains uncertain too. When Mr Ramaphosa signed the measure into law in September 2024, he agreed to postpone the implementation of two contested clauses giving provincial education departments increased powers over school language and admission policies. These clauses are set to take effect on 13 December 2024 unless agreement on alternatives is reached..Late in November 2024, the presidency, the minister of basic education and the Solidarity trade union (in a process facilitated by the National Economic Development and Labour Council or Nedlac, and aimed at averting a possible strike by teachers belonging to Solidarity) agreed that the two clauses would be implemented only in January 2026. In the intervening period, the education minister (currently the DA's Siviwe Gwarube) would adopt regulations to ensure, for example, that schools which were already full were not compelled to admit more pupils..Since this news broke, the presidency has effectively denied having been a party to the Nedlac agreement. In addition, both Mr Ramaphosa and Deputy President Paul Mashatile are adamant that any changes to the BELA Act must be agreed by a recently established GNU disputes committee. At the same time, the ANC has issued a statement condemning the DA for its supposed attempts "to bypass established processes in a desperate bid to perpetuate apartheid-era standards in our education system". According to Solidarity, however, the Nedlac agreement was properly concluded, remains binding, and must be taken into account in any GNU negotiations..Other committed supporters of the NDR.The SACP, which still has great influence within the ANC, is adamant that the NDR must proceed. Towards this end, it wants not only a Basic Income Grant, but also the introduction of a National Social Security Fund. This Fund is likely in time to put an end to private pensions, in much the same way as the NHI will put an end to private medical schemes. The SACP also seeks prescribed assets, a wealth tax, the introduction of various state banks, and an end to "austerity" measures aimed at controlling public debt. To reduce unemployment, it wants the state to provide public employment to some 2 million people by 2030..The Umkhonto we Sizwe Party (MKP), now the official opposition, wants even more radical NDR interventions. Among other things, the MKP wants to amend the Constitution to eliminate the doctrine of judicial review, under which the Constitutional Court is empowered to strike down laws inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. This would restore the damaging doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty that prevailed in the apartheid period. The MKP also wants to change the Constitution's property clause to facilitate the nationalisation of land and other natural resources..The MKP claims to have many sleeper members within the ANC. This, it says, will enable it to take control of the ANC at its next elective national conference, due in 2027. Were this to happen, an ANC under new leadership could oust the DA from the GNU and form a new coalition government with the MKP (which has 58 seats in the National Assembly) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which has 39..However, whether a new coalition government of this kind would in fact be formed seems unlikely. On the contrary, the ANC alliance might prefer to keep the current GNU in place until the 2029 election to help advance the revolution..Using the GNU to advance the NDR.Keeping the current GNU in place until the next general election in 2029 could assist the NDR in several ways. First, this would avoid a switch to an overtly radical "doomsday" coalition that would roil bond and equity markets, choke off new investment, and undermine the public/private partnerships needed to resolve energy, transport, and water crises. In this adverse scenario, the ANC could lose even more voter support in the 2029 election. By contrast, if jobs and delivery improve, the ANC could obtain an outright majority..Second, the DA could be significantly weakened by five years in the GNU. On BELA, for example, the DA's mandate from its voters is to oppose the Act, if necessary by going to court and having it struck down. Many of its supporters dislike the partial solutions the DA has instead been seeking to achieve. If, by 2029, the DA has in practice gone along with the ANC on a host of damaging NDR laws – on EE, BEE, the NHI, preferential public procurement and a new Expropriation Bill, to name but some examples – the party could lose significant support in 2029..Read more: SA at a crossroads: Coalition talks determine the nation's future – Ivo Vegter.Third, the ANC sees the GNU as an equivalent of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) and may thus want to keep it in place until it has fulfilled its function. The NEP was introduced in the Soviet Union in 1921 to prevent a mass peasant rebellion and stabilise a failing economy. To help achieve these goals, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) claimed to be moving away from socialism. It said it wanted a free-market system under state control, with socialised state enterprises operating on a for-profit basis. NEP reforms and reassurances were effective in increasing private sector investment, raising the growth rate, stimulating competition and reducing inflation. These gains helped revive the economy and lay the foundation for faster industrialisation. Once enough had been achieved, the NEP was jettisoned in 1928 and the shift to socialism continued..That the ANC sees the GNU as an NEP equivalent is apparent from what Mmamoloko Kubayi, then human settlements minister, wrote in the Sunday Times in August 2024 under the title "A strategic retreat by the ANC to advance its cause". Here Ms Kubayi explained: "The [NEP] example demonstrate[s] that entering a political coalition with political opponents for a specific purpose is not anathema in carrying out a revolution.".In the words of constitutional jurist Koos Malan, Ms Kubayi's analysis shows the ANC is using the GNU to "make a strategic retreat to enable future advances. It still aims to destroy the DA and to bring the private sector and civil society to heel under its totalitarian control"..The NDR prevails unless it is rolled back.Five years of the GNU could witness the adoption of many more NDR laws. To begin with, the ANC and its GNU allies have 62% of the seats in the National Assembly – enough to show "sufficient consensus" on what the ANC wants and to prevail over DA objections. Second, many ANC ministers will be able to use their regulatory powers to flesh out framework statutes (on EE and preferential procurement, for instance), with many harmful ancillary rules..At the same time, so many NDR laws are already on the Statute Book that the NDR will keep doing its damage even without any new interventions. So long as current NDR laws remain in place, South Africa will battle to attract fixed investment, push up the growth rate, or counter the unemployment crisis. In this situation, the free-market economy will continue to limp along – while the alternative "remedy" of expanding state control and citizen dependency will become more credible..The best way to defeat the NDR is to halt its further advance and then start rolling it back with singular determination and considerable speed. What the GNU needs to do – in an echo of President Xavier Milei's actions in Argentina – is to take a chainsaw to the thicket of NDR rules the ANC has already imposed on the country. Sadly, the ANC has so structured the GNU that the coalition government has little prospect of attempting this, let alone achieving it..Read also:.🔒 Hartford: SA's political crisis – The ANC faces a reckoning as populist offshoots split the nationalist legacyThe ANC's geopolitics and the National Democratic Revolution – Paul HoffmanSA's GNU is not a 'social democratic consensus': Ivo Vegter.*Dr Anthea Jeffery holds law degrees from Wits, Cambridge and London universities, and is the Head of Policy Research at the IRR. .This article was first published by Daily Friend and is republished with permission

Will the GNU actually halt the ANC’s NDR?: Anthea Jeffery

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