Dr Joan Swart: Why strong economies are now a national defence strategy

Key topics:Modern national security relies on economic and institutional resilience.Structural vulnerabilities create leverage for external pressure, not armies.Military strength supports resilience but is secondary to economic stability..Sign up for your early morning brew of the BizNews Insider to keep you up to speed with the content that matters. The newsletter will land in your inbox at 5:30am weekdays. Register here.Support South Africa’s bastion of independent journalism, offering balanced insights on investments, business, and the political economy, by joining BizNews Premium. Register here.If you prefer WhatsApp for updates, sign up to the BizNews channel here..By Dr Joan Swart*.For most of modern history, national defence meant soldiers, aircraft, and weapons. Economic policy determined prosperity; military policy determined survival. That distinction no longer holds.In the 21st century, states are rarely defeated first on the battlefield. They are weakened financially, administratively, and politically until resistance becomes impractical. Decisions begin to change not because an army has crossed a border, but because the cost of resisting external pressure becomes internally unbearable. Markets react, supply chains tighten, fiscal space narrows, and public confidence erodes. By the time military force appears — if it appears at all — the strategic outcome has often already been decided.This shift alters the meaning of national security. For middle and smaller powers especially, vulnerability now lies less in territorial exposure than in structural dependence: a narrow export base, energy concentration, politicised institutions, fragile infrastructure, or corruption networks that provide entry points for outside influence. These are typically discussed as development challenges. Increasingly, they function as strategic liabilities.A strong economy therefore does more than generate growth. It widens policy autonomy. It lengthens the time a government can absorb pressure without changing course. It prevents external actors from converting economic leverage into political outcomes. In that sense, economic structure has become a country’s first line of defence — and military capability its last..Read more:.Africa is heading toward another Great War, and SA is vulnerable: Justice Malala.The traditional image of coercion is dramatic: troops mobilising, missiles deployed, airspace contested. Modern coercion is quieter and often far more effective. It works by altering incentives rather than destroying assets.Instead of invading territory, external actors apply calibrated pressure across multiple domains simultaneously. Financial restrictions narrow access to capital. Regulatory actions complicate trade. Energy supplies become uncertain. Currency volatility increases borrowing costs. Targeted sanctions reshape elite calculations. Information campaigns amplify internal divisions. Individually they do not amount to war. Together they generate cumulative stress.The objective is rarely collapse. It is compliance.If policy shifts can be achieved through sustained economic discomfort, there is no need for tanks. If business confidence deteriorates sufficiently, domestic actors begin advocating “pragmatism.” If fiscal pressure mounts, governments quietly adjust positions. If public frustration grows, political cohesion weakens. The lever is not territorial conquest but strategic patience.Structurally exposed states are particularly vulnerable — those with narrow export markets, concentrated energy imports, fragile public finances, politicised institutions, or high corruption risk. Pressure in one sector rapidly spreads to others: a trade restriction becomes a currency problem, a currency problem becomes a debt problem, and a debt problem becomes political instability.These weaknesses rarely emerge suddenly. They accumulate gradually and are often treated as development concerns rather than security risks until a crisis reveals their strategic consequences. In practice, the capacity to absorb external pressure without institutional breakdown becomes the real measure of independence.If vulnerability is structural, deterrence must be structural as well. Resilience is not achieved through emergency measures during a crisis, but through everyday policy choices that limit the effectiveness of pressure before it begins.The first principle is optionality. A country that depends overwhelmingly on a single market, supplier, payment channel, or transport route grants others a lever over its decision-making. Diversification is therefore not only an economic efficiency question but a sovereignty safeguard. Multiple export destinations, varied energy inputs, and alternative financial channels reduce the chance that any single actor can create immediate national distress.The second principle is credibility. Predictable regulation, enforceable contracts, and impartial courts do more than attract investment; they stabilise expectations during periods of external pressure. When economic actors trust domestic institutions, they are less likely to amplify external shocks through capital flight or panic behaviour. Institutional reliability becomes a form of internal shock absorption.The third principle is continuity. Critical systems — electricity distribution, logistics networks, food supply chains, and digital infrastructure — must be able to operate under strain. Redundancy and manual fallback capacity prevent disruption from cascading into social instability. The objective is not perfect efficiency, but the ability to keep society functioning when conditions deteriorate.The fourth principle is integrity. Corruption networks and organised criminal structures provide external actors with ready-made influence channels. Where decision-making can be privately purchased, strategic pressure need not even be applied publicly. Anti-corruption enforcement and administrative competence therefore serve not only ethical purposes but protective ones: they close off avenues through which outside leverage quietly enters domestic politics.Taken together, these measures do not eliminate pressure. They make its effects slow, uncertain, and politically costly — which is the essence of modern deterrence.Where does the military fit into this framework? Not as the primary barrier to pressure, but as the guarantor that pressure cannot be rapidly converted into control.Armed forces in smaller and middle powers perform a different strategic function from those of major powers. They are not designed to project dominance abroad, nor to defeat a stronger opponent in a decisive battle. Their role is to prevent sudden outcomes — to ensure that no external actor can translate economic or political leverage into immediate faits accomplis.A credible defence capability buys time. Military design therefore determines whether economic resilience has time to work. It complicates escalation. It reassures domestic audiences that resistance is feasible and signals to external actors that coercion will not produce quick results. Modern pressure strategies depend on rapid internal effects. If stability holds, their leverage diminishes.In this sense the military underwrites the wider resilience system. It protects critical infrastructure during crises, secures borders against opportunistic escalation, and prevents intimidation from becoming an occupation. But it does not substitute for economic strength or institutional legitimacy. Without those, armed capability merely delays an inevitable outcome. With them, it reinforces deterrence by extending uncertainty.The relationship is therefore sequential. Economic and institutional resilience prevents most coercion from working; military capability prevents the remainder from succeeding rapidly. Together they preserve decision-making independence — the true objective of national defence.National defence is often discussed in terms of budgets, equipment, and force levels. Yet for many countries the decisive variables lie elsewhere: in the structure of the economy, the credibility of institutions, and the stability of society under pressure.Modern coercion rarely announces itself as war. It appears as financial strain, regulatory friction, supply uncertainty, and internal political tension accumulating over time. When these pressures find a system already brittle, policy autonomy narrows and choices are quietly reshaped. The outcome may look voluntary, but the conditions that produced it are not..Read more:.America’s national security held hostage by Trump’s trade deals: Ivo Vegter.Security policy must therefore extend beyond ministries of defence. Diversified trade, reliable administration, functional infrastructure, and public trust lengthen the time a nation can absorb stress without altering course. They deny external actors the rapid effects coercion requires. Armed forces then reinforce this resilience by ensuring that pressure cannot escalate into immediate control.The implication is straightforward. Prosperity is therefore no longer simply protected by security; it creates it. A country able to function normally under sustained pressure becomes extremely difficult to influence and nearly impossible to coerce. In the contemporary environment, economic strength and institutional integrity are not supporting elements of national defence. They are the terrain on which it is decided..*Dr. Joan Swart: PsyD Forensic Psychology, MBA, MA (Military Studies)

Dr Joan Swart: Why strong economies are now a national defence strategy

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