Key topics:
- Trump opens peace talks with Putin but faces a self-made contradiction.
- Ukraine’s security hinges on U.S. support, but Trump vows to avoid war.
- A weak deal risks emboldening Putin and leaving Ukraine vulnerable.
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By Andreas Kluth ___STEADY_PAYWALL___
Donald Trump did not end the Russian war against Ukraine within 24 hours, as he had promised during his presidential campaign. Then again, as usual, we probably weren’t supposed to take him literally (or was it seriously?). Now, though, he seems to be gearing up to get the job done. But he is about to crash into a contradiction of his own making. It’s a dilemma that may doom his efforts.
In a phone call this week, Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, agreed to begin talks to end the shooting. That followed Russia’s release of an American who has been unjustly incarcerated there, prompting Trump to comment that “there’s goodwill, in terms of the war.”
The president also dispatched a team led by his vice president to the Munich Security Conference this weekend. Trump’s point man for the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, Keith Kellogg, will gather input there to present Trump with negotiating options. It’ll be fiendishly hard.
Talks about turning bloodshed into truce are always fraught and harrowing — the negotiations to end the Korean war (culminating in an armistice rather than a peace treaty) took well over a year, during which the killing continued. In the Russo-Ukrainian conflict the list of sticking points seems endless.
It starts with the clash of irreconcilable narratives: The Russians keep doubling down on Putin’s fable that Ukrainians are really Russians who, misled by their “Nazi” leaders, forgot where they properly belong. The Ukrainians, backed by international law and world opinion, point out that they are a sovereign nation which Russia invaded and brutalized without provocation.
On it goes: Should Russia get to keep the land it has conquered? Trade some of it in return for the Russian territory that Ukraine currently holds? And what about the many Ukrainian children whom the Russians have abducted (a crime for which the International Criminal Court wants Putin arrested). Not least, there must be some reckoning for Russian atrocities committed since 2022.
The biggest obstacle to a deal, though, is the geopolitical identity of Ukraine after the war. Ukraine may officially be on track to join the European Union one day; that destiny offers cultural and economic benefits but few military advantages. As for NATO membership, the Trump administration, along with several other allies, has for now ruled out Ukraine’s accession.
That leaves open the biggest question: What security guarantee, short of NATO membership, can the West give Ukraine to deter Putin from attacking again a few years later? It must be credible, not only to keep the Kremlin at bay but also to reassure Ukrainians, who are still traumatized by the empty assurances given in 1994 by the US, UK and Russia, in return for which Ukraine gave up its Soviet-era nukes.
This is where Trump has boxed himself in. His entire foreign-policy shtick, besides a nebulous claim to “strength,” is that he will end or prevent foreign wars and bring American troops and dollars home rather than sending more of either abroad. But without putting American “boots on the ground,” or at least providing the firepower and whizzbang ordnance that America has and its allies lack, no security guarantee will be believable.
Here are some options that would exclude American boots on the ground, from least to most convincing. Western Europe could station lightly armed “peacekeeping” troops in Ukraine, under the aegis of the United Nations, say. That would at most amuse Putin, a man who thinks nothing of rattling his nuclear saber. (A similar effort under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, between Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of 2022, made no impression on him at all.)
Alternatively, the Europeans could make their deployment somewhat more martial, deploying thousands of troops from various countries and some hardware. The idea behind this “tripwire” strategy is that the Russians could attack and overwhelm these forces but would then trigger “punishment” by the countries whose soldiers were harmed.
That has long been NATO’s approach in its eastern member states, and notably the Baltic countries, where the alliance stationed some troops but not enough to parry a full-bore Russian onslaught. Whether the implied threat of punishment is credible has always been moot. In any event, the strategy assumes that, say, Estonia in the NATO case, or Ukraine in a future scenario, would first be overrun, and rescued only later, if at all. Kyiv won’t accept it.
That leaves a third option, which is called deterrence by “denial” as opposed to punishment. It means having enough troops and weapons on or near the border to repel a Russian attack from the first bullet. NATO is now trying to adopt this strategy for its member states, by upgrading its fighting forces from Finland to Bulgaria. It’s also what Zelenskiy wants for Ukraine, because that alone would keep Putin away for good, so that Ukraine can rebuild.
The problem with an all-European deterrence force is one of quantity as well as quality. Zelenskiy has called for about 200,000 troops (which would have to be rotated, requiring even more on standby). The European NATO members don’t have anywhere near that number to send without gutting their homeland defenses. Nor do the European armies have America’s fearsome surveillance, air- and firepower. Credible deterrence by denial without the US is impossible. That’s why Poland, for example, has said it won’t send troops to Ukraine without American backing.
Hence Trump’s dilemma. He probably could pacify the conflict, but that would involve a huge American commitment and the manifest readiness to get drawn into another war, which is the opposite of what he’s promised Americans. Even his most zealous MAGA stans would rebel.
Or he could twist European arms to do the pacifying, which would lack credibility. Ukraine would be hampered in rebuilding, war might break out again and more people would die and suffer. The Nobel Peace Prize that Trump craves so badly would stay out of reach.
It’s good that negotiations will begin at last. But talks are just that. The greatest worry remains Putin. But the second-biggest is Trump, who may not have understood the dilemma he faces. Worse, he may yet be tempted, for the sake of a deal-making “win,” to sell Ukraine out. As he said just this week, the Ukrainians “may be Russian someday, or they may not be Russian someday.” That’s not what I want an American president to think, much less express, when he sits down to confront an adversary like Putin.
Read also:
- 🔒 Trump advisers propose plan to end Russia-Ukraine war
- 🔒 The precipice of crisis: America’s foreign policy dilemma amidst Ukraine aid stalemate – Hal Brands
- Musk’s Ukraine U-turn: From hero to Putin’s pawn – Marc Champion
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