Key topics:
- “Woke” became a political battleground, dividing elites and ordinary voters.
- Liberal elites often co-opt movements, making them more divisive.
- Voter backlash stems from cultural focus over real economic concerns.
Sign up for your early morning brew of the BizNews Insider to keep you up to speed with the content that matters. The newsletter will land in your inbox at 5:30am weekdays. Register here.
If you prefer WhatsApp for updates, sign up to the BizNews channel here.
By Nia-Malika Henderson___STEADY_PAYWALL___
The idea of âwokeâ has animated US politics over the last few years. The word and the concept have become shorthand for the culture wars. At the Oscars, for instance, actress Jane Fonda offered her own definition, saying âwoke just means you give a damn about other people.â Two days later, in his speech to a joint session of Congress, President Donald Trump declared âwokeness is trouble, wokeness is bad, itâs gone and we feel so much better for it, donât we?â Sociologists and historians can often make better sense of political and social trends than journalists and the book We Have Never Been Woke: The Cultural Contradictions of a New Elite by Musa Al-Gharbi attempts to make sense of the woke and the post-woke era. Al-Gharbi is an assistant professor in the School of Communication and Journalism at Stony Brook University. This transcript has been edited and condensed.
Nia-Malika Henderson: Who is the âweâ in the title of your book?
Musa Al-Gharbi: The âweâ is the elite constellation that I call symbolic capitalists â people who make a living based on what they know, who they know, and how theyâre known. Think people who work in fields like finance, consulting, HR, media and education. They make a living by manipulating symbols and data and ideas.
The argument of the book is is that thereâs a few interesting things about symbolic capitalists. We enjoy much higher pay than most people, more autonomy than more most people, more prestige than most workers. And if you look at the landscape of America today, symbolic capitalists are pretty uniformly lined up behind the Democratic party and growing even more so over time. Weâre the slice of America thatâs most likely to self-identify as anti-racist, as environmentalists, as feminists, as allies to LGBTQ people and so on. We promised that if we had more power and influence over society, youâd see inequality shrinking. Youâd see longstanding social problems getting fixed. Youâd see growing trust in institutions.
And what the book shows is that over the last 50 years, we did get a lot more power and influence over society. But the the social world we promised is not the world we live in. Instead, we see growing inequalities over the last 50 years, increasing institutional distrust and dysfunction.
NH: You trace the âGreat Awokeningâ (a term you borrow from from Matt Yglesias, a Bloomberg colleague, whoin 2019 wrote about it in Vox) of the last few years back to 2010.
MA: Thereâs continuity between those who took part in Occupy Wall Street and those who took part in the later awokenings. They were overwhelmingly urban and suburban professionals and they overwhelmingly had college degrees or were in the process of getting college degrees.
These moments tend to occur during moments of âelite overproduction,â when society is producing more people that have expectations of being elites than we have the capacity to [sustain]. When we see a growing number of people who find themselves in that position, they often try to indict the social order that they think failed them.

In these moments, things have been growing worse for ordinary people for a while, and all of a sudden theyâre bad for a significant share of elites too. And this is when awokenings are likely to happen. Because you donât just have this frustrated group of elites, but thereâs this whole other constellation of people around them who are also have a bone to pick with the people who are calling the shots.
NH: One of the points you argue is that when liberal elites attach themselves to these movements, they can sometimes kill them.
MA: It often leads people who were longstanding participants in the movement to just bow out. Itâs no longer theirs. Iâll give one quick example: criminal justice reform. Before the creation of Black Lives Matter, there was growing awareness in conservative and Republican spaces that there were big problems with mass incarceration in the United States, big problems with the way policing was carried out. There was growing appetite for reform. As symbolic capitalists took over the discussion and really started striking these extreme and off-putting positions, this made the criminal justice reform movement a lot more contentious. It killed the movement for criminal justice reform that had been underway. And by the way, it also alienated huge shares of nonwhite voters. And so the First Step Act [of 2018], rather than being followed by more criminal justice reform, was followed up by basically nothing.
NH: You also argue that liberal elites missed this shift among core Democratic voters to Trump because we were so intent on seeing people who voted for Trump as racists or sexists or defective.
MA: Yeah, absolutely. In 2016, Trump won the Republican nomination with the lowest share of votes of anyone who had ever won the nomination in recent history. He was not super popular. There are studies of Republican primary voters showing they found Trumpâs racist, sexist language offensive. He would have done better if he struck a different posture, including and especially with White voters. Relatively affluent urban and suburban white voters, theyâre in the slice of America that cares the most about things like decorum and civility and the president being presidential, and Trump was not that.
NH: What about the shift of non-White voters toward Trump?
MA: That predates Trump and itâll probably continue after it. It seems to be driven more by votersâ alienation from the Democratic Party than it does with the unique characteristics or appeal of Donald Trump.
There are certain aspects of Trumpâs policy positions that probably appeal to non-White voters in a way that progressives are often reticent to talk or think about. So for instance, if you look at who in the Democratic coalition was more supportive of, say, the Muslim ban when Trump was advocating it, well, that would be Black and Hispanic voters. Immigration, gender affirming care for minors, talking about sexuality in K-12 schools â whoâs most skeptical of that? Religious minorities, ethnic minorities, folks who are more likely to subscribe to traditional views about gender and sexuality.
This is tough for progressives to reckon with because we tend to think all these social justice causes go together, and that there arenât meaningful frictions or tradeoffs. But in fact, the people that we claim to be advocating for and representing, thatâs not how they understand these issues at all.
NH: What do you make of the current backlash?
MH: One of the reasons that backlash is successful is because it it does draw on things that that are actually true. It is the case that many Americans donât have a voice or a stake in a lot of our institutions. If you live in âfly over countryâ then itâs actually tough to have an impact on the national discourse in the media. Thatâs just a fact.
So if you have these concerns about the way these knowledge-economy institutions are operating in society, if they seem hostile towards your values or way of life, the the normal consequence is to try to destroy those institutions. Thatâs actually a rational response.
And if you have these concerns, you get two different messages from political stakeholders. One of them being âThereâs nothing to see here. Actually, these institutions are great, and the only reason you would think theyâre not great is that youâre stupid or racist or sexist.â And the other party says, âYou know what, youâre right. There are problems in these institutions. You canât trust them to reform themselves. They refuse to even see the problem. You need to empower someone bring them back under control.â
If those are the two messages, then itâs easy to see which one is going to win.
I think sometimes, when we see our institutions under attack, we get into a defensive pose. This actually makes it worse. It is important for for us to try to defend some of our institutions and the work they do, but we also need to acknowledge some of the concerns that people have.
NH: So in this moment, what should lost-in-the-woods liberals be doing?
MA: The Democratic party is really oriented around [symbolic capitalists] and we have these kind of weird ways of talking and thinking about politics. We think itâs really important to focus on things like race, gender, sexuality differences. We think that if you don’t foreground and emphasise these things, that thatâs a failure to be real.
[But] these identity-focused policies are just deeply unpopular. They just strike a lot of people as unfair. So if you have a program thatâs supposed to, for instance, help disadvantaged people, but itâs focused on just helping Black or Hispanic disadvantaged people and excluding other ethnic groups, then thatâs tantamount to looking at other disadvantaged people and denying them benefits on the basis of their race. Itâs saying, âHey, I know youâre a struggling White guy, but tough for you.â And worse than that, the way a lot of these programs are structured, you end up having a lot of not-disadvantaged racial minorities benefiting the most.
You can actually make progress on a lot of these issues through universalised policies. A policy that helps disadvantaged people as a whole will disproportionately benefit African Americans without needing to explicitly target African Americans. This is the kind of policy that ânormieâ voters tend to think of as being more fair.

NH: But you still have to persuade people to get on board.
MA: One of the ways that symbolic capitalists, activists, even journalists lost the plot is a lot of us have lost our confidence to engage with normie people. We weâve lost our our confidence to persuade. If you look at the 1950s, you had groups like SNCC, the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, they organized on campuses to go out into the community. Today, that is not the norm. You have organising that happens on campuses that are narrowly focused on that institution. âHow can I get the university president to issue the right statement?â How is that gonna save anyoneâs life? Weâre just kind of narcissistically focused on our own institutions.Â
Persuasion means going to people who donât already agree with you and talking to them in a way that they will find compelling. I am a columnist for The Guardian and I write for The Nation and all of these other left outlets. But I also have bylines in the American Conservative and the National Review. A lot of my colleagues, they would rather lose an arm than have a byline in the American Conservative. And this is really undermines our ability to do the things that we say we want to do. If we want to actually move the meter and accomplish things in the world, you have to persuade.
NH: So, we are in the backlash, or anti-woke era. What might be next?
MA: Just as awokeings donât last forever, these periods of anti-wokening also donât last forever. The rival party often overextends, which is one of the reasons that we donât have permanent majorities in the United States. There are things that voters like about each party, but usually when a party gets voted into office it misunderstands its mandate. So you saw progressives doing stuff like focusing on renaming schools â something that just doesnât matter. If you ask parents who live in these communities what their concerns are for their kidsâ education, the name on the front of the building is never going be anywhere near the top of the list. And so we exert all this effort to change the name at the top of the building, and then we just go on to do our next culture war thing, and their lives continue completely unchanged. Thatâs the kind of thing that annoys voters.
So Trump took office. What are some of the first things that he prioritised? Well, weâre gonna rename Mount Denali into, what is it, McKinley? Weâre gonna change the gulf of Mexico into the Gulf of America. This is the same kind of symbolic crap that alienates voters and itâs kind of a loser, because youâre not really addressing peopleâs material concerns.
Read also:
- Wilgenhof revisited â Woke critics unable to resist a yearend attack
- đ Muskâs Ad Astra preschool is the next step in his anti-woke education dreams
- Chuck Stevens: Is woke culture waning?
© 2025 Bloomberg L.P.