Another fabulous contribution from RW Johnson today, which you’ll read in Part Two of his essay on the world’s seismic geopolitical shifts. This segment specifically focuses on the impact of these substantial global changes on South Africa.
There’s a lot to digest in Part Two. However, something he raises continues to perplex me. It seems that everyone in the developing world perceives the West – and especially America – as the ideal emigration destination. No one wants to emigrate to Russia or China. This fact is indisputable, as demonstrated by the Berlin Wall and Chinese emigration.
Yet a significant proportion of developing nation politicians – our own ANC-SACP and EFF at the forefront – are desperate to politically transform South Africa into Russia/China replicas. Or at the least vassals (or worse) of these unattractive autocracies. Why can’t voters make this connection?
___STEADY_PAYWALL___There’s also the developing world’s narrative on the former colonial powers, even 60 years later. Many, in particular, have a fondness for the empire builders in Moscow who held Eastern Europe hostage, at gunpoint, for almost half a century. Ask any Czech, Pole, Hungarian, or East German. Â Once again, no connection made.
If you thought education was expensive, consider the cost of ignorance.
– Alec Hogg
What global focus shift to Indo-Pacific means for South Africa (Pt 2)
By RW Johnson
As America shifts its central focus to the Indo-Pacific region, so the whole world will follow. At which stage, if not long before, most South African readers will be demanding to know “So what does all this mean for South Africa ?” It’s a bit like the story of the Polish Corridor (Poland’s route to the sea) in the interwar period. Poles were utterly fixated on this question, The story is told of a naturalist who came to Warsaw at that time to give a talk on elephants and found that he was bombarded with questions about “Elephants and the Polish Corridor”. In the same way, South Africans view any international development, no matter how major, through parochial glasses.
The first point, is of course, that Africa is a peripheral concern in these great power rivalries. Forget silly talk about “the African century”. Also forget the polyanna-ish ANC vision of a polycentric world in which all countries are equal. Perhaps unfortunately, the world has never worked like that: power is about economic strength, military might, population and natural resources.
For the last several hundred years the world has worked best when there has been a hegemonic power. As hegemons go, Britain and America, for all their sins, were about as beneficent as one is likely to get. A world dominated by a totalitarian autocracy like Russia or China would be nightmarish: no democracy, no freedom of speech or of the press, no independent courts. There would, though, be plenty of jails, of gulags and re-education camps. Take your pick.
Traditionally, Africa has been seen by the other great powers as essentially Europe’s concern and responsibility. For Russia and China Africa is essentially about natural resources. As can be seen, Russia’s Wagner group is quite fixated on that; it grabs gold mines or any other sort of loot it can. Astonishingly, thus far most Africans don’t seem to mind. At least, the AU has had nothing to say on the matter.
This would appear to be because an AU condemnation of Wagner would be embarrassing to those African states who have sided with Russia – such as South Africa and those employing the Wagner group.
Indeed, one of the major oddities today is the way that those who make anti-imperialism their cause – in South Africa, the SACP, EFF and ANC – are absolutely silent about the activities of the Wagner group, though it is the very crudest form of imperialism, accompanied by major crimes against humanity. Clearly, despite South Africa’s public professions of non-alignment its pro-Russian feelings far outweigh its dislike of imperialism. The problem is, of course, that this is perfectly obvious to the West, so those professions of non-alignment are not believed.
Africa is Europe’s baby
European concern for (and aid to) Africa is partly motivated by a residual feeling of responsibility for ex-colonies, though it is notable that the French have pulled back somewhat from the Sahel countries whose military regimes have preferred to hire the Wagner group. Mainly Africa is viewed as a market for European goods. There is limited interest in making productive investments in Africa because there is always so much uncertainty over the changing political environment.
Moreover, in not a few African countries when a government runs short of money it frequently comes up with a sudden and huge new tax demand levied on foreign companies, which are seen as targets of opportunity.
Traditionally, South Africa was the only exception to these drawbacks and a great deal of foreign investment flowed in here, though since the ANC’s advent to power the country has been viewed with the same caveats applying elsewhere in Africa.
African migrants and North Africa
In recent years increasing European attention has fastened on the never ceasing flood of African migrants seeking to move to Europe. Politically this has already become a hot potato and has triggered the rise of right-wing parties in many European countries. The fact is that in highly developed European countries there is a limited demand for unskilled labour which is often not even literate in the local language. Moreover a high proportion of these illegal migrants are Muslims and Islam too is a touchy political subject in many cases. Above all, the coming and huge African population boom means that the numbers of such would-be migrants are bound to increase prodigiously. Gradually and unevenly, Europe has moved to a more and more restrictive attitude to this migratory flood.
One result of this has been increased European attention to “gateway” countries through which the migrants seek to come, essentially the North African littoral and Turkey. Typically, the EU gives money to such countries in return for their agreeing to restrict this unwanted migration. One can envisage a future in which the whole North African littoral becomes a frontier barrier zone – an awkward situation since there is no shortage of North Africans who would themselves like to migrate to Europe.
Effectively, Europe will have to treat North Africa in the same way that the US has treated Mexico. As Mexico pointed out, the US had to choose: if it didn’t invest heavily in creating jobs in Mexico, it would find itself flooded by Mexican immigrants. In practice both things have happened. The US has included Mexico in Nafta (the North American Free Trade Agreement) along with Canada and Mexico has boomed. It is now an upper-middle income country and the world’s 15th biggest economy. By 2050 it is expected to be the 7th, 6th or even 5th biggest.
If Europe makes similar arrangements with North Africa (perhaps granting it some association with the EU) its real southern boundary will shift from the Mediterranean to the Sahara. That is, after all, what happened under the Roman Empire.
European hesitations
If, however, the US leaves Europe to defend itself this could have important results for Africa. European countries would probably turn inward and the tendency towards a Fortress Europe would probably strengthen. Apart from strengthening anti-migrant feeling this would result in higher European defence spending and a general charity-begins-at-home feeling which might limit European attention to Africa.
Will the EU continue to subsidise the AU ? When Ms Dlamini-Zuma headed the AU she was embarrassed by its dependence on foreign subsidies and wanted to end this arrangement. She couldn’t: most African states don’t pay their dues and are only too happy if someone else will pick up the tab. But if the AU sides with Russia, the EU could get fed up.
There are some countervailing forces. As India becomes one of the top three economic powers it will probably turn to Africa for many raw materials, just as China did. Secondly, Africa is the only continent whose population is set to soar. This will make it an increasingly important market.
Thirdly, the fact that Africa is balkanised into no less than 54 countries has its importance. (By contrast the whole of Latin America, including Central America and the Caribbean islands, consists of only 21 countries.) What this means is that the African vote is often decisive in many international organisations from the UN on down. As may be seen from the diplomatic struggles occasioned by the Russo-Ukraine war this then leads to considerable great power activity in trying to harvest or influence the African vote.
The growing importance of the Indian Ocean rim
Moreover, at present the fiercest great power confrontation occurs in the Pacific but as India’s importance grows this will spread fully to the Indian Ocean area. This will make East Africa – particularly its ports, from Cape Town to Djibouti – increasingly important. All the contending powers will have a major naval presence in the Indo-Pacific and will want ports where they can have bases, drydocks, and where they can refuel and re-provision themselves and allow their crews some R & R.
This will represent a major commercial opportunity for Mombasa, Maputo, Richards Bay and Durban in particular, though Cape Town too could benefit if it is adroit in offering the right services. But there will be greatly increased air traffic too and either Nairobi or Durban could become the major African hub for that. Already the Indian diaspora in East Africa, Durban and Mauritius is often well-connected into the Indian Ocean world and the Gulf and those networks are likely to grow and will be utilised by the entire business world.
In general the main competition for Indian Ocean commercial opportunities will be between Kenya and South Africa and South Africa’s ports and coastal cities will need to be on their toes. Kenya has none of South Africa’s ideological hang-ups or restrictive labour policies and it is growing at a steady clip of 5% p.a. Its economy is smaller but far more dynamic. At present even South African trade is being diverted increasingly to Maputo. In other words South Africa will have to shake off its current malaise if it is not to lose this competition.
China and India
A great deal will depend on the China-India rivalry. Of course, a rapprochement between the two countries is not impossible. But it seems unlikely. China’s invasion of India in 1962 was a major trauma and left deep scars. Since then there have been several border clashes in the Himalayas. India is bitterly aware that China is stronger – and also allied to its perennial enemy, Pakistan. By joining the Quad India has begun to move into the American camp.
What might change this situation is the fact that Chinese growth has slowed and it no longer looks inevitable that China will overtake America. China has a major property bust, huge debts, an alarming shortage of water and a declining population. In addition Chairman Xi Jin Ping has begun to interfere aggressively in private companies and this could stymie growth and investment. India is now growing faster than China and that might continue, especially since China’s population is predicted to fall almost by half by 2060. Should India catch or overtake China, all things are possible. But at present this is an imponderable.
As India grows, so will its presence in the Indian Ocean, indeed it will seek supremacy there. It will wish to take full advantage of the Indian diaspora down the East coast of Africa, just as China has made considerable use of the overseas Chinese communities in the Pacific area. All of which could make the expansion of Indian power and influence of particular importance to Africa.
Choosing sides
The most likely future, then, is of a confrontation between an alliance of autocratic and authoritarian states (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea etc) and a loose alliance of more democratic states (the West plus India, Australia, Japan, South Korea etc). This will be a more polycentric world than the Cold War but it will still have only two large camps. That will force many countries to choose sides.
That will be a particular problem for BRICS. Anomalously, BRICS is currently dominated by the Russia-China alliance of authoritarian autocrats but it has three democratic members – South Africa, India and Brazil. It has many new applicants for membership but one may be confident that Russia and China will not accept any changes which might threaten their dominance.
What looms at the end of the day is a choice of values, just as in the Cold War. Already many countries have recoiled from China’s totalitarian-surveillance state with its human rights abuses. As in the Cold War, the West is simply far more attractive. Huge numbers of people in the Third World want to emigrate to the West but no one wants to migrate to China or Russia. At present countries like South Africa are trying to ignore these factors but that is probably not a viable option in the long term.
Opportunities
In short, the future will be different but it will contain many opportunities for South Africa. The question is how ready South Africa will be to seize them ? Under the Afrikaner Nationalists South Africa was held back because it not only had absurd restrictive practices like Job Reservation and racial segregation but because its policies provoked international boycotts and sanctions. Under the ANC it is held back even more by other restrictive practices (affirmative action, BEE, inflexible labour laws etc) and by general governmental incompetence and corruption.
The point is that the huge shift towards the Indo-Pacific will still leave Africa as marginal but by the same token it will be well away from the great power confrontation over Asia. That could be a blessing, just as South Africa’s remoteness from the Cold War confrontation was. And that shift to the Indo-Pacific will bring many opportunities. The question is really whether South Africa will be ready to take them.
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