RW Johnson: Poorly negotiated GNU leaves major players with huge challenges, future problems

The negotiations for the Government of National Unity (GNU) revealed tensions within the ANC between factions preferring alliances with different parties. Ramaphosa's attempt to include smaller parties to obscure a crucial deal with the DA was met with mixed success. The DA's participation is vital for governance improvements, but internal ANC dynamics and resistance could undermine the GNU's effectiveness. The outcome remains uncertain as both parties face significant challenges and compromises..Sign up for your early morning brew of the BizNews Insider to keep you up to speed with the content that matters. The newsletter will land in your inbox at 5:30am weekdays. Register here..Join us for BizNews' first investment-focused conference on Thursday, 12 September, in Hermanus, featuring top experts like Frans Cronje, Piet Viljoen, and more. Get insights on electricity and exploiting SA's gas bounty from new and familiar faces. Register here..By RW Johnson .___STEADY_PAYWALL___.The negotiations for the GNU have been instructive. Originally the key fault line lay between the ANC National Working Committee (which favoured a deal with the DA and IFP) and the National Executive Committee where many feared they might go to jail if the DA launched an anti-corruption crusade and others feared being cut out of (more or less corrupt) ANC patronage deals. As a result the NEC leaned towards a deal with the EFF which, when it comes to patronage and corruption, talks the same language as the ANC. .The problem, of course, was that Jacob Zuma's MKP had stolen so many votes from the EFF that it had won only 9.5% of the vote, which meant that even together with the ANC's 40.2% there was still no majority. Within the NEC the pro-EFF faction clustered around Paul Mashatile who has had good working relations with Malema's party. The NEC was so opposed to a deal with the DA that Ramaphosa decided not to push it to a vote. Instead he came up with the GNU formula, suggesting the ANC would gather all the smaller parties together, thus reinforcing its role as the vital centre. The aim, of course, was to make the deal with the DA and IFP more palatable by "dissolving" them in a larger group. .In fact the "rats and mice" parties bring almost nothing to a GNU. The Patriotic Alliance, when it has gained power locally in the Western Cape, has been a corrupt disaster. Both its President, Gayton Mackenzie, and Deputy President, Kenny Kunene, have served long prison terms for their criminal activities. Many of the other small parties have only one or two seats and few of them have any experience of running a major organisation. It is hard to imagine that they could provide many capable ministers. .But the point of including these rats and mice was simply to help Ramaphosa camouflage the crucial deal with the DA. And that really was crucial. The DA is the only party with a strong governance record and it is trusted by the business community and the markets. It was perfectly clear that any hope of turning around the ANC government's long downward slide was to harness the abilities and good governance of the DA. There was nothing to suggest that any other party could halt that slide – and Ramaphosa would have been a fool not to know it. The moment that it appeared likely that the DA would join the government the Rand and the JSE both shot up. As the former ANC and SACP veteran, Raymond Suttner, wrote, "It is only the DA that has the power to provide the support to the ANC that is needed in a government of minorities and hence ensure stability"..The problem, to be blunt, was that the ANC had the arrogance and self-confidence born of thirty years of uncontested power. Many of its leaders and leading cadres could not easily get their heads around the fact that ANC hegemony was now a thing of the past, that the electorate had thumpingly decided that ANC government had failed and it wanted something new and different. (In the polling we did in the election run-up we found that even large numbers of those intending to vote ANC said they would like a new start and a fresh government.) In the minds of many ANC leaders, the party was being very generous to suggest that the DA might play a part in a future government. But they were clearly shocked at having to deal with a DA which assertively demanded its full quota of ministers and showed no deference to the sainted "liberation movement". The ANC protest against the DA's "outlandish and outrageous" demands was really just a cry of pain at having lost its majority.The DA had its own debate and decided that it wanted to go the whole hog: Helen Zille favoured a "confidence and supply" arrangement which would have left the DA controlling parliament but the ANC free to continue its downward slide. She was over-ruled and the DA decided it wanted to play the fullest possible role in running the government. The DA's demands for 10 ministries included a Deputy President position for John Steenhuisen, a deputy minister of finance and various ministries including water and sanitation, transport, health, minerals and energy, trade and industry and half a dozen others. In addition the DA demanded the devolution of police powers and railway management to the provinces..Ramaphosa responded by including a whole bevy of rats and mice parties in the GNU – camouflaging the real coalition for the NEC but also diluting the DA's position. This was a retrograde step. Not only do the rats and mice bring nothing of value to the government, they make it less manageable and they leave the role of Opposition to the EFF and MKP. This guarantees that the ANC will be continuously bombarded with racist rhetoric and accusations of selling out. This will be very bad for the nerves of NEC members who will in any case be worried about jail, the loss of corrupt opportunities and the probability of further losses of patronage due to the 2026 municipal elections. This torrent of abuse will reach a crescendo as the ANC prepares to replace Ramaphosa in 2027. .If by then the GNU has been anything but a clear success – measured by faster growth and a noticeable fall in the unemployment figures – there is a great danger that this will tip the ANC into a deal with the EFF/MKP, presumably under the leadership of Paul Mashatile or someone equally reprehensible. For the last seven years Ramaphosa's personal wealth has effectively protected the country from the possibility of another looting President and state capture. But if we get a Mashatile or similar administration we will be back in state capture under a looting administration, of which the EFF will likely form a part. The only direction from there is down..So the GNU absolutely has to perform. And since it is clear that little can be expected of ANC ministers, that means that – even for the sake of the ANC – the DA ministers have to make a large and clear impact. From this point of view it is essential that the DA puts forward determined, able and hard-working ministers, preferably people already with experience of running a large department, city or business. The key people in the DA for this purpose are those who have run major towns or cities or provincial departments – or, possibly, DA-supporting businessmen with executive experience. Helen Zille, a fine mayor of Cape Town, a premier of the province and, before that, a successful provincial minister of education is a perfect example of what is needed. Even at age 73 she would make an excellent national minister of education. .The negotiations were instructive in a number of different ways. Ramaphosa, supposedly the expert negotiator, was at best mediocre. He must have known that to make the other side an offer, to then have it accepted but then to withdraw your offer (of the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (DTIC)) was a disastrously bad error. Why did he do such a thing ? Because, apparently, Mashatile and Mantashe objected to the DA getting DTIC. .But that was absurd. Mashatile is already under fire for alleged corruption. He has just acquired the Guptas' old mansion in Constantia. How does an uneducated member of the "Alex mafia" manage to buy a whole series of mansions in Gauteng and the Cape ? Do you really need to ask ? Mantashe has already been fingered for possible corruption by the Zondo commission. He is, notoriously, a champion for coal against renewable energy. It's interesting that his wife owns a coal mine. How did that happen ? Again, do you need to ask ? It's typical of ANC politics that Ramaphosa should be willing to privilege the views of such discredited figures over any considerations of the national interest..Ramaphosa also took exception to the DA putting its demands and its position in letters. Yet this is standard form and makes for greater clarity. He also attacked Helen Zille for being condescending. Yet if one reads her letters, there is nothing condescending there: they are admirably clear and straightforward. The fact is that ANC leaders often have an inferiority complex. They expect whites to be better educated and smarter so they are often hypersensitive to the possibility of condescension. The problem, one realises, is just the opposite. The ANC demands deference and Zille was addressing them as equals. She was thus a woman refusing to show deference to men. For African girls, victims of a deeply patriarchal culture, are taught to keep their eyes downcast and thus always to "show respect" for men – but Zille, quite rightly, assumes gender equality. .Ramaphosa's claim that the DA was "moving the goalposts" was pure cheek. The DA had gone from demanding 10 ministries to 8 to accepting six. That is, it had continually moved the goalposts in favour of the ANC, much to the displeasure of its own voters. And his accusation that the DA wanted "to set up a parallel government" was simply absurd. But Ramaphosa knows enough to realise that when you have badly blundered in negotiations it is often necessary to bluster and accuse your way out of trouble..The DA, on the other hand, often appeared far too keen for a deal. Early on Helen Zille naively told the press how "Floyd Shivambu saved the day" by asking for a caucus break in parliament. The DA had resolved not to vote for Ramaphosa as President or Thoko Didiza as Speaker unless they had a "signed deal" with the ANC about a GNU. Even more naively, Ms Zille made it clear to the press how relieved she was that the DA had not had to live up to that resolution. She made it far too clear that the DA was desperate for a GNU. It was also unwise for Ms. Zille to get photographed in triumphal pose, as if celebrating a victory. That photo was used over and over again to prove that the DA felt "entitled" and that it was getting more out of a GNU than the ANC. The fact is that for the DA a GNU was a "nice to have" but for the ANC it was about survival..In fact nothing would have served the DA better than to let Ramaphosa's and Didiza's elections fail. It would have sharply reminded the ANC that it now depended entirely on keeping its word with the DA. This was a point where the DA had maximum leverage and it should have insisted that it wanted a binding agreement on cabinet posts before it agreed to vote for either Ramaphosa or Didiza. The fact that it only got a (much vaguer) signed agreement at the very last moment and, so to speak, at gun point, was a strong indication that the ANC was holding back on a deal and would probably welsh on it. Which it did. The DA was extremely naive and from there on in it continually retreated..The DA also made a mistake by placing such emphasis on Steenhuisen becoming a deputy president or, later, a minister in the presidency. These are essentially vanity positions. Many others work in the presidency and a lone DA outsider would be unlikely to matter much. De Klerk was deputy president from 1994-96 and had no discernible impact. Moreover, Steenhuisen has only ever been a town councillor and politician. He has never run anything and has no professional expertise. If he were not the party leader it is difficult to believe that he would be seen as a potential minister at all. In the end the DA had to drop the minister in the presidency idea anyway..Instead of wasting its time over a vanity position for Steenhuisen the DA would have done better to concentrate on getting ministries with real impact. A DA minister for minerals and energy, for example, could have had immense impact. Gwede Mantashe, the current minister, has single-handedly been responsible for much of the load-shedding. He delayed the introduction of renewable energy for many years. His insistence on the ludicrous mining charter has meant no new mines being sunk for over a decade. His failure to update the cadastral system has been responsible for the complete collapse of new prospecting for minerals. Having a decent minister in that position would enable the creation of thousands of new jobs, the ending of the energy crisis and a major advance towards renewable energy, enabling South Africa to garner the $9.3 billion in international financial support which it is currently on the brink of losing. (Why ? Because Mantashe has broken the deal and kept coal-fired power stations going.) Having a good DA minister in that position alone would have had a large and measurable impact on unemployment and economic growth..Similarly, a good DA minister of health might breathe life back into the public hospitals, with a huge impact on public well-being. A good DA minister of transport could hurry along the improvement of the railways, docks and container terminals. This would have had a major impact on our exports and thus on economic growth. A DA minister in charge of infrastructure could also work wonders. Or public industries….And so on. .So it was very disappointing that the DA gradually gave way in the negotiations. Ultimately, they seemed willing to accept not the nine ministries they should have had but only seven. And then only six. A party making up a third of the GNU somehow ending up with only a fifth of the posts. No Health, no Minerals, no Energy, no Transport, no Home Affairs, no Public Industries, no Infrastructure. Just a collection of mainly minor ministries with little economic impact. In the end the DA even accepted Agriculture (minus land reform) instead of the DTIC. Moreover, there was no longer any mention of the devolution of policing powers or railway administration to the provinces. It wasn't just a climb down but a whole series of climb downs. .For its own sake and its self-respect the DA should have withdrawn from the talks rather than climb down so much. By continuing to negotiate it merely communicated its desperation for a deal and that it was willing to be treated shabbily. On the basis of the deal as it now stands the DA ministers will make little impact and the cynical suspicion will grow that the party leaders have simply been seduced by the lure of high office and sold out their liberal principles. From that point of view the DA could not afford to accept ministries with little impact. .Had the DA withdrawn Ramaphosa would have been the chief loser. The only hope for the Ramaphosa wing of the ANC was that the DA would help them turn the economy around and accelerate growth. And the DA had huge leverage. Investors would have seen the failure of the GNU negotiations as a major red light. The Rand and the markets would have fallen hard. And the government would continue to fail. That was the outcome Ramaphosa absolutely had to avoid. .Had Ramaphosa been a better leader he would have convinced the ANC that a more generous deal with the DA was actually its own route to survival. For the fact is that the ANC is in free fall. By the end of last year unemployment (on the narrow definition) had reached 32.9% and in the first quarter of 2024 a further 67,000 jobs were lost. This is the highest unemployment rate in the world. Unless this trend can be reversed, the ANC is doomed. So Ramaphosa had to face down internal opposition and make sure the DA was properly included with major impact ministries. And he had to move Mantashe from his current post. It is all very well to say that Ramaphosa relies on Mantashe's support too much to think of moving him on, but that is ridiculous. The Old Pals Act can't be more important than a national emergency. Make Mantashe deputy president if you like. It wouldn't matter. .Meanwhile Ramaphosa has committed himself to bringing in NHI and, by the end of the year, a Basic Income Grant. These are both disastrously unaffordable commitments. In other words the government is heading straight into a major storm, with employment falling, unaffordable promises to fulfill and a growing fiscal crisis which could soon land the ANC at the IMF's door. The ANC has been acting as if it is the lord of all it surveys when in fact its situation is desperate. All that it has achieved is to pull the DA into the government by offering them only minor posts, so from now on as the government fails the DA will get much of the blame..There is, moreover, another problem. The ANC leaders were so convinced of their own hegemony that they wouldn't believe that the pre-election polls were telling them the truth – and they pushed quite a few tame journalists to pour cold water on those polls. Up until the very last minute Ramaphosa continued to insist that the ANC would get well over 50% of the vote. But the polls were telling them the absolute truth. The electorate had decided that the ANC had comprehensively failed them and they wanted a change. It was a very nasty surprise for the ANC and it is still in denial..By the next election, however, the truth will have sunk in. And even if its leaders do not encourage such a thing, the ANC is full of crooks, criminals and corruption beneficiaries, let alone desperate members of the SACP and Cosatu, who will find the idea of a further ANC defeat intolerable. Election rigging was never a great danger while the ANC was winning easily. But with the ANC so vulnerable and with the EFF and MKP out in the cold, deprived of patronage and bitter with hunger, there will be a large number of criminal and violent people only too willing to rig elections if they can..Read also:.Members Only Ep 3 – Rand's GNU verdict, demented Biden and Paul TheronGNU flashpoint – the Trade & Industry smoking gun"Leveraging, not growing": The DA's path to real power – Martin van Staden

RW Johnson: Poorly negotiated GNU leaves major players with huge challenges, future problems

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