South Africa has managed to escape the “African liberation movement model” due to its unique political pluralism, diverse population, and a long history of representative government. Unlike other African countries, South Africa’s ruling party accepts opposition legitimacy, fostering a multi-party democracy. Nelson Mandela’s reconciliatory leadership and the country’s acculturation to democratic norms have further strengthened its democracy. However, the future remains uncertain, with threats from authoritarian figures like Julius Malema and Jacob Zuma.
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By R.W. Johnson
Why has South Africa thus far escaped from the constraints of the “African liberation movement model” ? ___STEADY_PAYWALL___ Many factors have influenced this development, starting with the size and variety of the country which feeds into a natural political pluralism. (True, many African countries are large and various but their pluralism is over-ridden by authoritarian government.) In Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe the ruling parties do not really accept the legitimacy of Opposition parties and accordingly feel free to use ballot-rigging, intimidation and violence to prevent them from succeeding. They are thus quasi-one party states. Zanu-PF has been in power for 44 years and the MPLA and Frelimo for 50 years, with no end in sight. This is a very different situation from South Africa where Opposition is legitimate, elections are reasonably free and the ruling party has lost its majority status.
In some African countries there is only one big city and one dominant ethnic group. If a nationalist party can capture that city or that group, it gives it a natural monopoly – often leading on to a one-party state. In Zimbabwe, after all, Shona-speakers make up 80% of the population so once Zanu managed to become the dominant Shona party it was bound to be the ruling party.
South Africa is emphatically not like that. For a start, there is a much larger white minority, an even larger mixed race group and well over a million and a half Indians. The Nguni are the largest African group – though they are not a majority – and they are divided into Zulus, Xhosas and Swazis. Zulus, at 13.8 million, are the largest single group but their relationship with the ruling party is problematic: in 1994 and 1999 KwaZulu-Natal elected the IFP and in 2024 Jacob Zuma’s MKP was by far the biggest party, with the ANC reduced to 17%.
It should never be forgotten that the ANC was formed largely because African leaders realised that they were so divided along tribal lines that it had been easy for the whites to ignore them entirely while uniting the country into the Union of South Africa in 1910. Thereafter ANC leaders struggled largely in vain against these internal divisions and by 1945 the party was still small and insignificant. It was only the onset of apartheid which saw it unify and grow into the dominant party of 1994-2004. But, deprived of the unifying force of the great enemy, apartheid, the ANC has suffered repeated splits, is riven by factionalism and is falling back into the much weaker and more divided party that it was between 1910 and 1950.
It is also of great importance that South Africa has had a long history of representative government, albeit on a largely racially exclusive basis. The Cape Colony, which had a non-racial (though strongly qualified) franchise, had representative and responsible government from 1854 on, while the Natal Colony had an elected majority on its Legislative Council since 1856. The Boer Republics from their very outset had powerful and democratic (though whites only) Volksraads. As has been noted elsewhere in Africa – particularly in Senegal – the long experience of these forms of government became part of the local culture and strongly influenced popular expectations to this day. In effect the disenfranchised majority were like spectators at a tennis match, observing the game, often quite expertly, and understanding how it worked. Moreover, until apartheid did away with them, there were also Native Representatives in Parliament – thus accepting the principle that blacks should be represented. All that these “spectators” wanted was to be allowed to play themselves – and when that happened they already understood free elections, political parties, parliamentary procedures and majorities. This contrasts with their far more limited and recent history in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.
In a sense this acculturation to notions of representative government was merely part of what the Communist academic, Jack Simons, was referring to when he pointed out that all races in South Africa lived in a “common society”. That is to say all races were regulated by Roman-Dutch laws governing marriage, property and contract. More broadly, black South Africans used most of the artefacts of “white civilisation”, whether it be modern cities, mechanised agriculture, motorways, trains, cars, telephones, radios or other consumer goods. They worked in the same mines, companies and city administrations, sent their children to school, frequently adopted the Christian religion and even played and followed the same sports. Nowhere else in Africa was this true, largely because South Africa was economically more developed and because its much larger and permanent white population had transformed the country in which it had settled. It was this belief in a “common society” which underlay the Freedom Charter’s statement that South Africa belonged to all who lived in it, black and white – a sentiment not found in African nationalism outside South Africa. Admittedly, this notion was introduced by white Communists, but praise to them is due.
It was also of great importance that South Africa had a peaceful transition to majority rule. In Angola and Mozambique the MPLA and Frelimo were effectively the victors when the Portuguese army mutinied and in Zimbabwe, too, the Smith government was increasingly unable to deal with the Zanla guerrillas pouring in from Mozambique. Moreover, Zanu evaded its agreement with Governor Christopher Soames and infiltrated its guerrillas into many villages where they effectively ensured a Zanu vote. In South Africa the apartheid police and army were still fully in control while the transition took place and Umkhonto guerrillas played no part. In fact the armed struggle had effectively exhausted itself by then anyway and Mandela soon agreed to its suspension. The two sides then had to work as partners as they hammered out a new Constitution. Effectively this meant that the ANC had to accept the legitimacy of the National Party government and the existing multi-party system. This was the best possible launch for South African democracy and the debt owed to FW de Klerk for his courageous U-turn is a lasting one.
When the ANC exiles returned to South Africa in 1990 they underwent a further process of acculturation to a society which had greatly changed since they had left it. Trade unions were now powerful, apartheid had largely broken down and there was far more racial mixing than the exiles were used to. And local blacks were thoroughly used to a free and diverse media so the ANC would have to get used to that too.
Despite their avowed socialist objectives many of the exiles sought to become rich businessmen and almost all of them saw South Africa as a wealthy country which could well afford to provide them with a high consumption lifestyle. They also had to get used to a pluralist society with free speech and a great variety of opinions, multiple political parties, newspapers, radio and TV stations. At first they displayed strongly authoritarian instincts but over time they had to become used to living in a more liberal society with its many viewpoints and its wide range of choices. And like politicians in any free society they had to get used to being criticised or ridiculed.
At first the ANC tried to exercise the strong centralist control which had been typical of its exile years but this soon became impossible. In exile the ANC had been the sole provider of income, scholarships, jobs and opportunities. Now its activists quickly inserted themselves into a great variety of local or corporate niches and were no longer so dependent on the party. When Cyril Ramaphosa resigned as ANC Secretary-General in 1996 to go into business, Thabo Mbeki attempted to insist that he was still under party orders. Ramaphosa, he said, had been “deployed” to the business sector by the ANC. It was a thin pretence and as more and more ANC activists entered the business sector there was no further suggestion that they had been “deployed”.
Finally, South Africa was lucky with Mandela. Elsewhere in Africa the personality of the first post-independence President had been of decisive importance. With his political party at the height of its powers and unconstrained by precedent or settled expectations a President Mugabe or Banda could have a decisive effect on the development of the new state. Mandela too had immense power when he took office but he opted to play very little role in governing the country and instead concentrated on making gestures of reconciliation and representing the country internationally. He had far stronger conciliatory and democratic instincts than other ANC leaders, as was evident in his denunciation of Sani Abacha, his disapproval of Mugabe and his reaching out to such unlikely figures as Betsy Verwoerd in Orania. Mandela thus helped the country through its key early years and set an example which has had a lasting effect. Cyril Ramaphosa as a young man had hero-worshipped Mandela and there is little doubt that his formation of the GNU in 2024 was guided by Mandela’s example.
There are, then, multiple reasons why democracy has a better chance in South Africa than in other African “liberation movement” states. But that is not to say that democracy is secure. It is perfectly clear that democracy could not survive if Julius Malema or Jacob Zuma came to power. Malema rules the EFF in completely authoritarian style and clearly sees himself as a President-for-life. Zuma has already made it clear that the MKP will have no elective conferences and will thus be solely ruled by him. And both Malema and Zuma would use their power mainly for looting.
However, South Africa has now had thirty years of free elections and a free media. The ruling party, which had no experience of such a system when it returned from jail or exile, has been socialised into its norms so that when the ANC lost power in Cape Town or Pretoria, it accepted its defeat, albeit with some difficulty, and it has not disputed the 2024 election result which severely clipped its wings. This in turn strengthens public anticipation of democratic behaviour, making it more difficult for politicians to depart from its norms. And the longer that those democratic norms are observed, the stronger they become.
This, then, is the most secure basis for optimism about South Africa’s future. To be sure, ANC government has been utterly ruinous and many of its policies are absurd and self-defeating. For the African poor ANC governance has been a huge disaster, making them worse off than before. The quality of ANC leadership has fallen steadily ever since Mandela and Ramaphosa is the weakest chief executive the country has ever had. But in a democracy such weaknesses have consequences and mistakes are remediable. There is still a long road to travel but thus far the country has borne out Jan Smuts’ belief that it was a place in which neither the very best nor the very worst happens.
Read also:
- Paul Hoffman: Will constitutional democracy prevail over democratic centralism in South Africa?
- Is South Africa’s costly democracy producing incompetent leaders? A call for electoral merit to ensure quality leadership
- Mailbox: South African farmer calls for citizen education to ensure future of Constitutional Democracy
