Controversy is raging over the credibility of the national election results in neighbouring Mozambique where Frelimo’s Daniel Chapo won by over 70% of the vote. In this in-depth interview with BizNews, Tertius Jacobs, the Mozambique analyst for the private risk management company Focus Group takes viewers through the results; the claims of election manipulation; and the apparent assassinations of two opposition figures documenting electoral fraud and leading the team working on an appeal to the elections commission. He describes the ensuing nationwide unrest and the police response. Jacobs also gives a comprehensive update on the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. Meanwhile, the country is on a knife edge as it awaits the validation of the results by the Constitutional Council.
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Extended transcript of the interview ___STEADY_PAYWALL___
00:00:16:12 – 00:00:33:21
Chris Steyn:
Controversy is raging over the credibility of the national election results in neighboring Mozambique. We speak to Tertius Jacobs, the Mozambique analyst for the private risk management company, Focus Group. Welcome, Tertius, and thank you for making time.
00:00:33:23 – 00:00:35:07
Tertius Jacobs:
Thank you for having me.
00:00:35:09 – 00:00:39:07
Chris Steyn:
Right. Please recap the election results for our viewers.
00:00:39:09 – 00:01:20:04
Tertius Jacobs:
Yeah, so, as expected, Frelimo won the election. There was a presidential election and legislative elections, and Frelimo won both. The presidential candidate, Daniel Chapo, won in every province. On the legislative side, Frelimo actually increased their seats in parliament by 11 seats. Frelimo aside, the main candidate expected to oppose Chapo was Venâncio Mondlane.
00:01:20:06 – 00:01:48:14
Tertius Jacobs:
He received about 20% of the approved votes nationally. To give some context, the National Elections Commission in Mozambique counts election results from polling station reports or district-level results sheets that are sent to them.
00:01:48:16 – 00:02:16:23
Tertius Jacobs:
They then decide to approve the results or ask for recounts in certain areas. Once they approve it, it goes to the Constitutional Council. If the Council approves, the results are finalized. So, currently, we have preliminary election results, approved with an asterisk, as they may still change depending on the Constitutional Council’s final decision.
00:02:17:01 – 00:02:42:16
Tertius Jacobs:
But, for now, the approved results show Mondlane with 20%, obviously losing to Chapo. In the National Assembly, Mondlane’s party, Podemos, which was previously a non-parliamentary party without any seats, has now secured 31 seats, becoming the main opposition party.
00:02:42:18 – 00:03:15:08
Tertius Jacobs:
For years, Renamo was the main opposition with 60 seats in 2009, but now they’re down to just 20, which is a significant decline.
00:03:15:10 – 00:03:51:04
Tertius Jacobs:
Renamo’s candidate, Ossufo Momade, also saw a drop in presidential support, falling to 5.8% of the votes. So, yes, Frelimo won as expected, but there’s some controversy surrounding this. Mondlane came in a close second, though it’s somewhat all or nothing for him. Without a win, he risks diminishing his long-term relevance. That said, Podemos’ win is beneficial for him, and there are talks about him becoming the party president in the future.
00:03:51:06 – 00:04:19:20
Tertius Jacobs:
Mondlane had initially been independent, but for influence in government, he needed legislative backing. He first approached the CAD umbrella coalition, but they were blocked from the legislative race for lack of support, leading him to align with Podemos at the last minute.
00:04:19:22 – 00:04:47:04
Tertius Jacobs:
Thus, Mondlane isn’t as closely tied to Podemos as Chapo is to Frelimo or Momade is to Renamo; he’s more of an independent with Podemos’ support. If Podemos were to distance themselves, he’d be left without much footing. So, his position is precarious, and the election results weren’t ideal for him. Much of the unrest, which we can discuss further if you’d like, seems to stem from this.
00:05:29:23 – 00:05:33:12
Chris Steyn:
What have been the biggest concerns regarding how this election was conducted?
00:05:33:16 – 00:06:02:14
Tertius Jacobs:
The biggest concerns… I’ll quote one of the Mozambican analysts. There were many expressing similar sentiments. One analyst literally said, “Frelimo will win with fraud,” and he was very adamant about it. In terms of substantiating this claim, the analyst did not provide much evidence.
Read more: The Economist: Mozambique’s ruling party wins a dodgy election
00:06:02:14 – 00:06:33:01
Tertius Jacobs:
However, what we have seen is that some district courts have confirmed instances of election manipulation. There have also been reports from investigative journalists in neighboring Zimbabwe, claiming they were actually able to participate in the Mozambican vote, despite being Zimbabwean nationals. They interviewed other Zimbabweans who reportedly did the same.
00:06:33:03 – 00:07:05:14
Tertius Jacobs:
Again, the credibility of this claim is questionable, about fifty-fifty. The bigger issue, which is somewhat subtle, is Mondlane’s massive following, especially among the youth in Maputo City. Despite this, Chapo won across the board.
00:07:05:16 – 00:07:37:05
Tertius Jacobs:
In Maputo City, where it was expected that the race would be closer, Chapo received 54% of the votes, while Mondlane received 34%. This result has raised many questions. More seriously, the European Union Election Observer Mission released a statement saying they were not allowed to observe the vote counting.
00:07:37:06 – 00:08:03:22
Tertius Jacobs:
They expressed concerns that the National Elections Commission (CNE) is withholding the district results sheets, which include vote details per polling station. Even the European Union has noted numerous irregularities, calling the process questionable at best.
00:08:10:07 – 00:08:33:18
Tertius Jacobs:
So, even disregarding local discontent and allegations of manipulation, with a prominent entity like the European Election Observer Mission casting doubt on the transparency and credibility of the process, it all becomes ambiguous.
00:08:33:20 – 00:08:54:22
Tertius Jacobs:
We had anticipated a much closer competition between Mondlane and Chapo, yet the race wasn’t close at all. With all the allegations surrounding the election process, it lends weight to the claims of irregularities.
00:08:55:00 – 00:09:05:22
Chris Steyn:
Tell us about the apparent assassination of two opposition figures documenting electoral fraud—these were the leaders of the team working on an appeal to the Elections Commission.
00:09:06:00 – 00:09:36:11
Tertius Jacobs:
Yes, on Friday, October 18, around midnight, two individuals were attacked. One was Mondlane’s lawyer—his surname was Dias. The other was Paulo Guambe, the spokesperson for Podemos. They were reportedly documenting electoral fraud.
00:09:38:12 – 00:10:18:09
Tertius Jacobs:
They were in Maputo City, in the commercial market area, when, upon leaving, they noticed people around them. As they drove off, some of these people reportedly followed them. Later, the vehicle was attacked, with around 25 bullets fired, killing both Dias and Guambe.
00:10:18:11 – 00:10:47:08
Tertius Jacobs:
There was a third person in the car, a woman, who survived and was taken to the hospital. She corroborated the story, reporting that people had followed them before opening fire. As for the motive, Mozambique is a complex landscape of insecurity and tension, so the reasons behind this remain uncertain.
00:10:47:09 – 00:11:15:05
Tertius Jacobs:
That’s a very open-ended question. But the issue is less about who did it and more about the fact that it happened and the timing of when it happened. You’re not going to convince a disgruntled electorate that this wasn’t politically motivated. In the court of public opinion, even if it were just common crime, it doesn’t matter.
00:11:15:07 – 00:11:19:22
Tertius Jacobs:
And I don’t think 25 bullets justify calling it a common robbery.
00:11:19:22 – 00:11:21:09
Chris Steyn:
Strong message.
00:11:22:17 – 00:11:53:00
Tertius Jacobs:
Absolutely, and that’s the key. It’s definitely a message being sent, and these two were specifically targeted. There’s a lot of uncertainty, but common sense suggests this was clearly politically motivated. The issue isn’t necessarily that these people died—it’s what their deaths signify in the broader context.
00:11:53:02 – 00:12:19:18
Tertius Jacobs:
Before this happened, we were discussing the potential for violence and unrest with local election experts in Mozambique, and the general narrative was that it was a 50-50 chance. Mondlane had called for a strike prior to these political killings, and all of our local sources indicated that it was uncertain whether it would materialize.
00:12:19:20 – 00:12:55:06
Tertius Jacobs:
Local election experts noted—and we attended a briefing by ISS where an election expert mentioned—that the expectation was Mondlane supporters, though they might be disgruntled, likely wouldn’t have the energy or motivation to incite widespread civil unrest and violent protests against the election results. Our local sources also pointed out that the nature of a national strike…
00:12:55:13 – 00:13:19:05
Tertius Jacobs:
…and it’s important to clarify that “strike” here just means staying away from work or not participating. The issue with staying away is that many of these Mondlane supporters depend on the informal sector for their livelihoods. They need to go out daily to sell their produce and earn their bread.
00:13:19:06 – 00:13:44:19
Tertius Jacobs:
This dependence on daily earnings means they can’t afford to stay away from work; they can’t risk it because it threatens their subsistence. As a result, the risk was seen as leaning more towards the possibility that nothing major would happen despite the discontent. People couldn’t really afford to participate in the strike.
00:13:44:21 – 00:13:58:18
Tertius Jacobs:
But then, before the murder of these two people, it was expected that nothing substantial would happen. However, their deaths served as a catalyst for all that followed.
00:13:58:20 – 00:14:06:13
Chris Steyn:
So, actual unrest did ensue, and the police responded. Can you describe what happened?
00:14:06:15 – 00:14:38:02
Tertius Jacobs:
Yes, so they were killed on Friday night, and over the weekend, we started receiving reports about what would unfold. The emphasis then shifted to the national strike planned for Monday. Mondlane’s message was to shut down and stay away in honor of those who died—without violence, looting, or anything of the sort.
00:14:38:04 – 00:15:05:14
Tertius Jacobs:
But people were frustrated, and that emotional side drove a desire to act. Early Monday morning, it was quiet. I arrived at work, spoke with our sources and information managers in Mozambique, and it seemed that nothing significant was going to happen. But emphasis was placed on the events starting at 9 a.m.
00:15:06:00 – 00:15:28:06
Tertius Jacobs:
Then, from 9 a.m., people began marching toward city centers. Initially, the main unrest was in Maputo City, with some disturbances in Beira City. It eventually spread to Pemba City as well.
00:15:28:08 – 00:15:56:22
Tertius Jacobs:
Throughout Monday, media started flooding in with pictures and videos. I’d say about half of it was misinformation—people spreading old footage as though it were new. We did see Mondlane going to Maputo City, speaking to the media, and giving his statement on the situation.
Read more: The Economist: John McDermott – Two murders roil Mozambique’s politics
00:15:57:00 – 00:16:28:18
Tertius Jacobs:
There was a video where the police started to disperse the crowds close to him. You could hear rubber bullets going off. It was a big ruckus, and eventually, he ran off, withdrew. After that, we were informed he went into hiding. He sent a message, I think it was probably just a statement on social media, either yesterday or the day before.
00:16:28:19 – 00:16:53:16
Tertius Jacobs:
In the message, he said that while he is in hiding, he isn’t hiding from the situation; he’s just taking security precautions. That happened, and then on Tuesday, things started to settle down, continuing into Wednesday. But on Thursday, the election results were announced, and we saw tensions flare up again.
00:16:53:18 – 00:17:27:22
Tertius Jacobs:
Toward the end of Thursday or Friday, we saw the internet being cut. Our sources on the ground reported that mobile data was completely off—almost all mobile data—but fiber lines and satellite connections were still online. So, the cut was focused specifically on mobile internet.
00:17:28:00 – 00:17:54:11
Tertius Jacobs:
It’s worth noting that in many African countries, social media is effectively the internet for many people. They don’t visit news websites; instead, they read the news on platforms like Facebook. So if you want to cut off messages that could encourage unrest, cutting mobile internet makes sense. That’s what we saw happen.
00:17:54:12 – 00:18:23:22
Tertius Jacobs:
By Friday and Saturday, things started to calm down again. We received messages yesterday that Mondlane has called for another strike on Monday, claiming that 4 million people would participate. But again, it comes back to subsistence issues. Even with commitment from 4 million people, if there’s no food in their homes, they won’t participate.
00:18:24:00 – 00:19:00:12
Tertius Jacobs:
So, there’s a potential threat for Monday. So far, I believe around 16 people have been killed in election-related incidents, and many more injured. I speak under correction; it may be 16 injured who were admitted to Maputo Hospital. Regardless, there’s been widespread unrest and violence. One video showed people marching.
00:19:00:14 – 00:19:20:17
Tertius Jacobs:
I think it was from Monday morning. The person recording the video said they were joining the protest because they’re unhappy with the government and the election results. What stood out to me was that they specifically mentioned the killings, saying, “They are killing people.”
00:19:20:18 – 00:19:45:18
Tertius Jacobs:
This, again, shows what sparked everything into action. It’s a 50-50 situation, and our security experts in Mozambique told us that if things start tilting toward the side of unrest, there’s a real risk it could spiral. Once the momentum of discontent and frustration builds, it can be hard to stop.
00:19:45:20 – 00:20:14:09
Tertius Jacobs:
If things go badly, they could deteriorate very quickly. We’re seeing some days of intermittent stability, likely due to people needing to secure their subsistence income. But specific days are being singled out for protesting against the results.
00:20:14:11 – 00:20:36:18
Tertius Jacobs:
In his latest statement, Mondlane again urged supporters not to loot or destroy each other’s property. However, I think Nampula province saw some violence. There was a video showing a local market or possibly a hospital being looted. So, if things spiral, they spiral badly.
00:20:36:20 – 00:20:49:20
Chris Steyn:
What are the international economic and security interests that have cemented Frelimo’s regime, making it so crucial for them to stay in power?
00:20:49:22 – 00:20:53:21
Tertius Jacobs:
That’s a loaded question. The main thing you’ll find…
00:20:53:23 – 00:20:58:19
Chris Steyn:
I’m thinking of the income from the gas fields—that’s substantial, isn’t it?
00:20:58:21 – 00:21:31:07
Tertius Jacobs:
The thing with most African governments, whether as stable and prosperous as Botswana or as insecure and unstable as Mozambique is right now, is that in most cases, the post-independence ruling parties that have maintained power since independence tend to have significant interests in the country’s mega projects, whether it’s transparent or not.
00:21:31:09 – 00:21:57:05
Tertius Jacobs:
I can use Botswana as an example. You can commend Sir Seretse Khama for what he did and the role of the state in getting Botswana to where it is today, but holding that position gives you access to business opportunities. This link might not necessarily be corrupt or unethical; it’s simply that being in that position means people want to do business with you. The same can be said for Frelimo, and it’s a trend seen across the world—if you’re in power, people want to do business with you.
00:21:57:06 – 00:22:20:00
Tertius Jacobs:
In Mozambique, there are several long-standing gas-related mega projects, and the country is one of the world’s largest coal producers. All of this reinforces the idea that those in power benefit from their position. Consequently, it’s possible that major stakeholders within the ruling party may have economic interests aligned with these projects.
00:22:20:02 – 00:22:47:01
Tertius Jacobs:
Again, regardless of the level of power, holding office presents opportunities for financial gain, and many people would go to great lengths to maintain that power. With the LNG project in Cabo Delgado, potentially one of the biggest natural gas deposits in Africa, there’s a prospect for substantial financial gain.
00:22:47:03 – 00:23:15:05
Tertius Jacobs:
If you’re in power, there’s an even greater chance to benefit from it. As for any current direct connections between the ruling elite and these economic interests, I’d rather not comment on that to remain diplomatic. But it is a very logical link.
00:23:15:07 – 00:24:04:10
Tertius Jacobs:
We see this across Africa. Take a small example like South Africa, where you might see political killings at the municipal level—people killing each other just for a seat at the table because of access to power and money. If you amplify this to the national level, there’s an even stronger incentive to retain that power.
00:24:04:12 – 00:24:09:07
Chris Steyn:
Meanwhile, can you give us a status update on the security situation in Cabo Delgado?
00:24:09:09 – 00:24:34:15
Tertius Jacobs:
In Cabo Delgado, over the past two weeks, it has become a less prominent focus in Mozambique. We have field workers and human intelligence on the ground, and we also use open-source intelligence. The open-source information, however, is extremely limited.
00:24:34:17 – 00:25:01:13
Tertius Jacobs:
This limited information is mostly due to the media’s focus on the elections and related unrest rather than Cabo Delgado, which has been in turmoil for so long that people are starting to tune out of the ongoing situation there. Since May, we’ve seen Rwandan forces deploy to the Macomia district after insurgents launched a large-scale attack on Macomia town on May 10.
Read more: Mozambique’s Frelimo names Daniel Chapo leader, eyes gas project revival amidst militant threats
00:25:01:15 – 00:25:27:17
Tertius Jacobs:
They maintained control over the town for 24 hours before they voluntarily withdrew. It’s crucial to note that they weren’t forced out by security forces; they chose to leave.
00:25:27:19 – 00:25:55:03
Tertius Jacobs:
Some might ask, why would they give up control like that? For insurgents, control over territory isn’t the goal. Their purpose is simply to be a persistent problem for the government. The attack on Macomia town, holding it for 24 hours, and then withdrawing was a message to the world, demonstrating their capabilities.
00:25:55:05 – 00:26:22:18
Tertius Jacobs:
They looted significant food supplies, and shortly afterward—what’s interesting about that attack is that it happened just days before SAMIM withdrew from Mozambique. I believe it was only two or three days before the attack that some large contingents of SAMIM forces moved from Macomia town to Pemba, and then the attack occurred.
00:26:22:19 – 00:26:50:20
Tertius Jacobs:
After that, the looters had enough supplies, and for a month or two, the insurgents were well-stocked in logistics. We expected a follow-up campaign from them, but nothing happened. Then, the Rwandans increased their deployment to compensate for SAMIM’s withdrawal, with estimates suggesting around 4,000 to 5,000 Rwandan troops in total.
00:26:50:22 – 00:27:21:01
Tertius Jacobs:
Approximately 500 to 1,000 of them were deployed to Macomia district. What we observed was more of a containment strategy, with insurgents located along the coast of Macomia district. There’s a vast forest there called the Katupa Forest, which has been a frequent base for insurgents since 2017.
00:27:21:03 – 00:28:04:09
Tertius Jacobs:
In 2022, the Joint Security Forces, including the Rwandans, cleared out the Katupa Forest. Around that time, there was significant insurgent activity in Nampula province as they expanded southward. Then in 2023, the insurgents returned to the Katupa Forest. Due to its density, it’s an ideal location for guerrilla groups to hide. Now, the security forces have positioned themselves strategically along roads and choke points, with the Mozambican and Rwandan naval contingents highly active along the coast of Macomia district.
00:28:04:11 – 00:28:25:05
Tertius Jacobs:
There were some bombardments, but for the longest time, no ground forces moved in to dislodge the insurgents. The problem with bombardment alone is that, as some counterinsurgency experts explain, you can disrupt them momentarily, but without ground forces clearing them out, they eventually return.
00:28:25:07 – 00:28:44:00
Tertius Jacobs:
So while bombardments might make them leave temporarily, the insurgents just come back once the shelling stops. Without ground troops to clear them out, this approach has limited effectiveness. It wasn’t until recently that we saw any ground operations being implemented.
00:28:44:00 – 00:29:12:22
Tertius Jacobs:
The prevailing strategy seems to be containment, keeping insurgents mostly within specific areas. Although insurgents still move northward to gather food, as their supplies in Macomia eventually run out, we see them conducting raids on villages for food. However, the majority of insurgent forces remain along the Macomia coast.
00:29:12:22 – 00:29:42:12
Tertius Jacobs:
This containment has led to some stability, with no major incidents occurring for a while. Most reports focus on the Macomia coast with sporadic insurgent activity to the north. It’s likely this containment was aimed at ensuring some stability for the elections, allowing at least parts of Cabo Delgado to vote. It seems that Macomia town itself was secure enough for voting, though the surrounding villages were not.
00:29:42:15 – 00:30:08:18
Tertius Jacobs:
Shortly after the elections, we began hearing rumors of security forces advancing toward key areas. The two main villages in question are Mucojo and Quiterajo. The insurgents had established de facto control over the strip between Quiterajo in the north and Mucojo in the south. Mucojo, a significant administrative post, has been under some degree of insurgent control for over a year.
00:30:08:18 – 00:30:33:02
Tertius Jacobs:
Security forces have now moved into this administrative post, and things have been quiet since. Then, just last week amid the widespread unrest and violence surrounding election-related issues, the joint security forces moved in and retook Mucojo village. And apparently, they did…
00:30:59:11 – 00:31:25:13
Tertius Jacobs:
So, with little resistance from the insurgents, it is now expected that the security forces may want to expand this operation. This ground assault is what we’ve been anticipating for a long time. It’s still uncertain what their next move might be, as information is limited at this stage.
00:31:25:15 – 00:31:50:17
Tertius Jacobs:
But we expect the security forces, especially those led by the Rwandans, to work on clearing the area. One of the major issues, however, is that the insurgents are using ground-based explosives. Some sources report they’re using IEDs, and the presence of IEDs indicates a higher level of competency and intent.
00:31:50:19 – 00:32:09:13
Tertius Jacobs:
While we’ve seen some IED incidents, most of what they’re deploying are landmines, which are easier for guerrillas to use. They place a landmine and leave, and if security forces encounter one, they’re forced to clear the entire road before advancing. This tactic creates challenges for asserting dominance in the area.
00:32:09:13 – 00:32:36:18
Tertius Jacobs:
A dense forest is a guerrilla’s best friend, and the environment complicates the security forces’ efforts. However, this containment strategy in Cabo Delgado has allowed for some degree of stability, despite the difficulties faced by security forces.
00:32:36:20 – 00:33:07:00
Tertius Jacobs:
The risk we foresee, however, is that if the coast of Macomia district and the Katupa Forest are cleared, it could cause the insurgents to scatter, potentially spreading instability. This dispersal could pose new challenges, as the insurgents might simply relocate and continue their activities elsewhere.
00:33:07:01 – 00:33:29:00
Tertius Jacobs:
Guerrilla fighters are highly mobile; they could move to Mocímboa da Praia, although there’s already a Rwandan contingent there. So far, insurgents have tended to avoid engaging the Rwandans, as guerrillas prefer engagements where they have a high likelihood of winning. The Rwandans’ competence has deterred insurgents in these areas.
00:33:29:02 – 00:34:01:15
Tertius Jacobs:
This is why the Rwandans were able to quickly reclaim Palma and Mocímboa da Praia in 2021 without much insurgent resistance. If the Rwandans clear out Macomia, we might see insurgents moving north to places like Nangade, or possibly south, which would increase risks to mining operations in southern and western Cabo Delgado.
00:34:01:17 – 00:34:24:06
Tertius Jacobs:
The insurgents have shown a pattern of moving south, as they did several times this year, and they’ve even gone west in the past. In 2022, they targeted the major mining areas there. So, there’s a chance that dispersing insurgents from their strongholds could spread the conflict across the region.
00:34:24:07 – 00:34:49:02
Tertius Jacobs:
This potential dispersal ties into the pre-election containment strategy. Scattering the insurgents around election time would have worsened the security situation across northern Mozambique, making it appear unstable. Keeping the insurgents contained allowed for a relatively safer election process.
00:34:49:04 – 00:35:14:06
Tertius Jacobs:
The goal was to keep the insurgency confined to specific areas, giving the impression of stability and allowing elections to proceed with minimal disruptions. So, for now, that’s the state in Cabo Delgado. There hasn’t been much major activity lately, but there are certainly concerns on the horizon.
00:35:14:08 – 00:35:22:00
Chris Steyn:
Now, lastly, if you could sum it up in one sentence, how do you see the future of Mozambique today?
00:35:22:01 – 00:35:51:13
Tertius Jacobs:
I would say, in two words: status quo. There’s a new president, but it’s the same ruling party. I know I’m going over one sentence here, but it’s challenging for Chapo; he has to navigate internal factions within Frelimo, which limits his ability to enact substantial change without causing conflict.
00:35:51:15 – 00:36:22:00
Tertius Jacobs:
So, in the short term, at least for the first few years, we’re looking at the status quo as he learns the ropes. As for the northern insurgency, the status quo will likely persist; military action alone won’t resolve this. The U.S. experience in Afghanistan has shown us that military power alone can’t defeat an entrenched insurgency.
00:36:22:01 – 00:36:27:20
Tertius Jacobs:
So, in one sentence, long-term, I would say: pretty much status quo.
00:36:27:22 – 00:36:40:19
Chris Steyn:
Thank you. That was Tertius Jacobs, the Mozambique analyst from the private risk management company Focus Group, speaking to BizNews after the Mozambican elections. Thank you so much, Tertius. And I’m Chris Steyn.
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