The ANC’s Tripartite Alliance faces deep fractures as the SACP challenges its alignment with the DA in the Government of National Unity, calling it a “betrayal” and hinting at electoral independence in 2026. Tensions over policy reform and Alliance reconfiguration risk a seismic political shift, potentially weakening ANC dominance while reshaping left-wing coalitions. With voters prioritizing unemployment, crime, and social issues, the GNU must deliver progress to maintain support amid these ideological rifts.
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By Dave Steward
There are serious problems in the ANC’s 34-year-old Tripartite Alliance.
In the first week of September, Solly Mapaila, the Secretary–General of the SAPC, launched an unprecedented attack on the ANC critcising it for having made “a gross error, a serious mistake” by having agreed to a Government of National Unity that included the Democratic Alliance. This was a “criminality” that would be judged harshly by history. It was a “betrayal of our people” and “a sell-out of the people’s aspirations.”
On 24 November the SACP and the ANC held a bilateral meeting to discuss their problems. The statement issued by the ANC after the meeting included several references to the “frankness” of the exchanges – which is a diplomatic way of saying that the discussions were heated and failed to reach agreement. Apart from its view that the ANC was deviating dangerously from the precepts of the National Democratic Revolution, the SACP was also frustrated by the ANC’s failure to respond positively to its persistent calls for the reconfiguration of the Alliance in a manner that would give the SACP and COSATU a greater role in the formulation of Alliance policies. The two organisations agreed to continue discussions and are scheduled to meet again on 25 January.
On 1 December the SACP Central Committee issued a statement to set the stage for the SACP’s Fifth Special National Congress which will be held in Boksburg between 11 and 14 December. The key task of the Special National Congress will be to “assert its (the SACP’s) independence – with unwavering determination in the struggle to end unemployment, poverty, inequality and the system of capitalist exploitation.”
In the Central Committee’s view, “the core issue in the policy space lies in the dominance of reformist policies” that had “heightened since the adoption of GEAR in 1996” and that had resulted in “long-term economic policy failure.” The reformist paradigm had been further entrenched by the inclusion of the “right-wing, neo-liberal DA” in the GNU.
The SACP believes that “the status quo will not change without a radical shift.” This will require “a decisive change not only in policy, but also in the political organisation and mobilisation of the working class.” The Central Committee will assert “the independence of the Party” by implementing the decisions of the Special National Congress “across all key fronts of struggle and power contestation”, including – significantly – “ the electoral front”.
It has long been the SACP’s position that it would consider contesting elections independently if it cannot reach a satisfactory agreement on the reconfiguration of the Alliance. No such agreement has been reached. The Special National Congress will, accordingly, finalise the modalities for participation in the 2026 local government elections under its own banner – and by definition – in opposition to the ANC.
Although no decision has yet been taken to leave the Alliance, SACP participation in the 2026 elections might signal a seismic shift in South African politics. COSATU – which is much closer ideologically to the SACP than to the ANC – would almost inevitably follow the SACP’s lead. However, it would also be very risky for the SACP – which has enjoyed massively disproportionate representation and influence in parliament and government because of its membership of the Alliance. It knows that if it leaves the Alliance, it might find itself out in the political cold – as it was between 1996 and 2007 when it and COSATU were excluded from any significant role in the formulation of policy.
The SACP can have few illusions about its likely success in contesting elections under its own banner. In 2005 it appointed a commission to consider whether the Party should attempt to win state power by contesting national elections as a separate political party. The commission reported that, “internationally, capitalist dominated societies are an extremely unfavorable electoral terrain for Communist Parties. There is not a single example of a Communist Party, on its own, winning national elections within a capitalist society – let alone using such a breakthrough as the platform to advance a socialist transformation.”
The alternative would be to establish an alliance with other left-wing parties and formations. In its statement of 1 December, the Central Committee stressed that in its “determination to build broader working-class unity,” it would engage with other “progressive worker and left formations, including trade unions” in its efforts “to forge a popular left front and build a powerful, socialist movement of the workers and poor.” It may have reached the conclusion that its long-term interests will be better served by an MK/COSATU/SACP alliance – than by remaining in the “reformist” ANC Alliance.
Ironically, this would be a resurrection of the SACP/COSATU/Jacob Zuma “coalition of the wounded” that defeated Thabo Mbeki at the 2007 Polokwane National Conference. The coalition’s victory opened the way to the radical second phase NDR policies, state capture, and unrestrained corruption that played a significant role in South Africa’s decline since 2007 and in creating the unemployment, economic stagnation and misgovernance of which the SACP now complains.
Such a development would have far-reaching implications for South African politics and for the GNU. On the one hand, it might (or might not) lead to a further weakening of the ANC’s support base. On the other hand, shorn of its radical left wing, the ANC might feel more inclined to revert to the broadly orthodox macro-economic policies that it implemented before the ousting of Thabo Mbeki at the Polokwane National Conference in 2007. Those policies achieved economic growth of 5,4% between 2005 – 2007. They cut South Africa’s debt to GDP ratio from 48,9% in 1996 to 26% in 2008 – freeing up billions of rands for social programmes. Most importantly, they helped to cut unemployment from 30,2% between 1996 – 1998 to 22,4% in 2008.
Everything will depend on how voters experience the next four years. Will the GNU be able to maintain its cohesion and will President Ramaphosa seize the opportunity of adopting pragmatic policies to achieve his proclaimed goals of achieving accelerated economic growth and reducing unemployment?
The present indications – drawn from the IRR’s most recent opinion survey – are broadly favourable for the GNU. All the principal parties in the GNU have seen their support stabilise or increase marginally – while the principal parties outside the GNU – MK and the EFF – have experienced a decline in support from 15% to 12% and 10% to7% respectively.
There also seems to be little appetite for radical policies. The main concerns of voters are unemployment (49%); abuse of women and children (28%); crime (25%); corruption (16%); load-shedding (14%); illegal immigration (13%) and education (12%). The radical agenda – including BEE (8%); inequality (2%); racism (2%) and land reform (1%) – have minimal support. However, the situation is fluid: 28% of South Africans have a favourable view of the GNU compared with 20% who have an unfavourable view. 25% are neutral or unsure and 27% have little knowledge of the GNU.
This presents the GNU with enormous challenges: of maintaining its cohesion during the next four years; of marketing its activities far more effectively; and, above all, of delivering higher economic growth; greater employment opportunities; and vastly improved security, education and social services. It will be easier to achieve these goals if the ANC is no longer shackled ideologically to the SACP and COSATU. It will also require remarkable skills and maturity from the DA which should, perhaps, take a leaf from the SACP’s book of not “claiming to have shaped the course of things”… “as opposed to being a mature … party that can play a vanguard role without labelling it as such”. It might also consider the need to practise what the ANC calls “dexterity in tact and firmness in principle.”
At the end of the meeting, both delegations expressed appreciation for the frankness of the engagement and the camaraderie that prevailed throughout, despite the challenging circumstances resulting from the strategic setback of losing the majority status in the May 2024 elections.
“Our leader, our political elite, committed this criminality of joining forces with the DA. This was a political choice. I think they will be judged harshly by history – and I call on history to judge them badly for the betrayal of our people. This is a betrayal. It cannot be entertained in any political decoration. It cannot be placed in any other form. It’s a sell-out of the people’s aspirations.”
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